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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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THE MORALITY OF INTEREST ON CAPITAL.

In his address as President of the American Sociological Society at the annual meeting, December 27, 1913, Professor Albion W. Small denounced "the fallacy of treating capital as though it were an active agent in human processes, and crediting income to the personal representatives of capital irrespective of their actual share in human service." His criticism of the modern interest-system was, as he expressly declared, based primarily upon grounds of social utility rather than upon formally ethical considerations.

The Rev. William Hohoff has attacked interest from the strictly moral viewpoint. In a work entitled "Die Bedeutung der Marxschen Kapitalkritik" (Paderborn, 1908) he contended that whenever the owner of any sort of capital exacts the return of anything beyond the principal, there is committed a violation of strict, or commutative, justice (pp. 64-67, 88, 89, 96). According to his view, the Church has never formally authorized or permitted interest, even on invested capital (as distinguished from loans). She has merely tolerated it as an irremovable evil.

Is there any satisfactory justification of interest? If so, does it rest on individual or on social grounds? That is to say, is interest justified immediately and intrinsically by the mere relations that are entered into by the owner and the user or

beneficiary of capital? Or, is it rendered morally lawful only because of its effects upon society? What light, if any, is thrown upon these questions by the anti-usury legislation of the Catholic Church?

Taking up the last question first, we recall that during the Middle Ages all interest on *loans* was forbidden under severe penalties by repeated ordinances of Popes and Councils (Cf. Van Roey, "De Justo Auctario ex Contractu Crediti"; and Ryan, "The Church and Interest Taking"). Since the end of the seventeenth century the Church has quite generally permitted interest on one or more extrinsic grounds, or "titles." The first of these titles was that known as "lucrum cessans," or relinquished gain. It came into existence whenever a person who might have invested his money in a productive object, for example, a house, a farm, or a mercantile enterprise, decided instead to lend the money to some borrower. In such cases the interest on the loan was regarded as proper compensation for the gain which the owner might have obtained from an investment on his own account. The title created by this situation was called "extrinsic" because it arose out of circumstances extrinsic to the essential relations of borrower and lender. Not because of the loan itself, but because the loan prevented the lender from investing his money in a productive enterprise, was interest on the former held to be justified. In other words, interest on the loan was looked upon as merely the fair equivalent of the interest that might have been obtained on the investment.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, another title or justification of loan-interest found some favor among Catholic moralists This was the "praemium legale," or legal rate of interest allowed by civil governments. Whenever the State authorized a definite rate of interest, the lender might, according to these writers, take advantage of it with a clear conscience.

Today the majority of Catholic authorities on the subject prefer the title of virtual productivity as a justification. Money, they contend, has become virtually productive. It can readily be exchanged for income-bearing or productive

property, such as, land, houses, railroads, machinery, and distributive establishments. Hence it has become the economic equivalent of productive capital, and the interest which is received on it through a loan is quite as reasonable as the annual return to the owner of productive capital. Between this theory and the theory connected with "lucrum cessans" the only difference is that the former shifts the justification of interest from the circumstances and rights of the lender to the present nature of the money itself. Not merely the fact that the individual will suffer if, instead of investing his money he loans it without interest, but the fact that money is generally and virtually productive, is the important element in the newer theory. In practice, however, the two explanations or justifications come to substantially the same thing.

Nevertheless, the Church has given no positive approval to any of the foregoing theories. In the last formal pronouncement by a Pope on the subject, Gregory XIV (Encyclical, "Vix Pervenit," 1745) condemned anew all interest that had no other support than the intrinsic conditions of the loan itself. At the same time, he declared that he had no intention of denying the lawfulness of interest which was received in virtue of the title of "lucrum cessans," nor the lawfulness of interest or profits arising out of investments in productive property. In other words, the authorization that he gave to both kinds of interest was merely negative. He refrained from condemning them.

In the Responses given by the Roman Congregations from 1822 onward to questions relating to the lawfulness of loan-interest, we may profitably consider four principal features. First, they declare more or less specifically that interest may be taken in the absence of the title of "lucrum cessans"; second, some of them definitely admit the title of "praemium legale," or civil authorization, as sufficient to give the practice moral sanction; third, they express a genuine permission, not a mere toleration, of interest taking; fourth, none of them explicitly declares that any of the titles or reasons for receiving loan-interest will necessarily or always give the lender a *strict right*

thereto. None of them contains a positive and reasoned approval of the practice. Most of them merely decide that persons who engage in it are not to be disturbed in conscience, so long as they stand ready to submit to a formal decision on the subject by the Holy See. The insertion of the latter condition clearly intimates that some day interest taking might be formally and officially condemned.

Should such a condemnation ever appear, it would not contradict any moral principle contained in the "Roman Responses," nor in the present attitude of the Church and of Catholic moralists. Undoubtedly it could come only as the result of a change in the organization of industry, just as the existing ecclesiastical legislation has followed the changed economic conditions since the Middle Ages.

All the theological discussion on the subject, and all the authoritative ecclesiastical declarations indicate, therefore, that interest on loans is today regarded as lawful because a loan is the economic equivalent of an investment. Evidently this is good logic and common sense. If it is right for the stockholder of a railway to receive dividends, it is equally right for the bondholder to receive interest. If it is right for a merchant to take from the gross returns of his business a sum sufficient to cover interest on his capital, it is equally right for the man from whom he has borrowed money for the enterprise to exact interest. The money in a loan is economically equivalent to, convertible into, concrete capital. It deserves, therefore, the same treatment and the same rewards. The fact that the investor undergoes a greater risk than the lender, and the fact that the former often performs labor in connection with the operation of his capital, have no bearing on the moral problem; for the investor is repaid for his extra risk and labor by the profits which he receives, and which the lender does not receive. As a mere recipient of interest, the investor undergoes no more risk nor exertion than does the lender. His claim to interest is no better than that of the latter.

On what ground does the Church or Catholic theological opinion justify interest on invested capital? on the shares of

the stockholders in corporations? on the capital of the merchant and the manufacturer?

In the early Middle Ages the only recognized titles to gain from the ownership of property were labor and risk (Cf. St. Thomas, "Summa Theologica," 2a 2ae, q. 78, a. 2 et 3; Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, eq.). Down to the beginning of the fifteenth century substantially all the incomes of all classes could be explained and justified by one or other of these two titles; for the amount of capital in existence was inconsiderable, and the number of large personal incomes insignificant.

When, however, the traffic in rent charges and the operation of partnerships, especially the "contractus trinus," or triple contract, had become fairly common, it was obvious that the profits from these practices could not be correctly attributed to either labor or risk. The person who bought, not the land itself, but the right to receive a portion of the rent thereof, and the person who became the silent member of a partnership, evidently performed no labor beyond that involved in making the contract. And their profits clearly exceeded a fair compensation for their risks, inasmuch as the profits produced a steady income. How then were they to be justified?

A few authorities maintained that such incomes had no justification. In the thirteenth century Henry of Ghent condemned the traffic in rent charges; in the sixteenth Dominicus Soto maintained that the returns to the silent partner in an enterprise ought not to exceed a fair equivalent for his risk; about the same time Pope Sixtus V denounced the triple contract as a form of usury. Nevertheless, the great majority of writers admitted that all these transactions were morally lawful, and the gains therefrom just. For a time these writers employed merely negative and *a pari* arguments. Gains from rent charges, they pointed out, were essentially as illicit as the net rent received by the owner of the land; and the interest received by a silent partner, even in a triple contract, had quite as sound a moral basis as rent charges. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the leading authorities were basing their defense of industrial interest on positive grounds. Lugo,

Lessius, and Molina adduced the productivity of capital goods as a sufficient reason for allowing gains to the investor. Whether they regarded productivity as of itself a sufficient justification of interest, or merely as a necessary condition supplementing the fact that interest was socially useful, cannot be determined with certainty.

Today most Catholic writers seem to look upon a formal defence of interest on capital as unnecessary. They seem to think that interest is justified by the mere productivity of capital. The Church has never formally approved this view. While she permits and authorizes interest, she does not define its precise moral basis.

So much for the teaching of ethical and ecclesiastical and ethical authorities. What are the objective reasons in favor of the capitalist's claim to interest? We consider here only the intrinsic reasons, those arising entirely out of the relations between the interest-receiver and the interest-payer. In the next article we shall deal with the *social* grounds of interest on capital.

Who pays the interest to the capitalist? In one sense it is the consumer, for he provides ultimately the fund out of which all the agents of production receive their shares of the product. On the other hand, the Socialists assure us that interest is appropriated by the capitalist from the product of labor. Neither is strictly adequate. In fact, no categorical answer is possible. Everything depends upon the modifications of the present system which we regard as normal or feasible. While it is true to say that the product of industry is now distributed among four agents of production, landlords, capitalists, undertakers and laborers, it does not follow that an increase or a decrease in the share of one agent would all be subtracted from or added to the shares of the other agents. The change might be made in such a way that the loss or gain would be participated in by the State or by the consumer. For example, if land were taxed at its full rental value the disappearing share of landowner would go directly to the State, not to any of the other three agents of production. The latter would benefit only in-

directly, as members of the civil community. In attempting to answer the question before us, we may profitably consider two situations, according as we assume that interest is abolished with or without a preceding change in wages.

Any rise in wages which is sufficient to cause a rise in the price of commodities will, of course, lessen the net gain going to the consumer from the subsequent abolition of interest. Thus, if the renumeration of all the laborers who are now receiving less than living wages were raised to that level, there would undoubtedly occur some increase in the price of products. Consequently the reduction in prices which would follow the cessation of interest would not be as great as it would have been had these preceding increase in wages not taken place. But there would in all probability be some reduction. Assuming that a living wage for all workers is the normal condition, we can say that interest is today paid in part by the laborer and in part by the consumer. However, we may go further, and assume that completely just wages for all the working class would mean a considerably greater increase of remuneration than that just supposed. If this were brought about it might very well happen that the gain to the consumer from the subsequent abolition of interest would only just offset the previous increase in prices. In other words, prices would be back at the present level. From this point of view, we see that all interest is now paid by the laborer.

On the other hand, if interest were abolished without any previous rise in wages, the lion's share of the benefit would go to the consumer. In all competitive industries the efforts of business men to make larger sales would cause a considerable reduction in prices. Only the benevolence of some employers, and the alertness of organized labor would prevent the consumer from getting the whole of the commuted interest. In monopolistic industries the laborers might get somewhat more than in those subject to competition. From this point of view, we can see the greater part of interest is now paid by the consumer.

Fortunately the question whether interest is paid by the la-

borer or by the consumer, has no important bearing upon the question of its intrinsic justification. It is true, as we shall see hereafter, that the laborer's right to decent wages is superior to the capitalist's right to interest, but this principle affects only the relative strength of the latter right, not its very existence. So far as the morality of interest is based upon intrinsic grounds, it is determined exclusively by what the capitalist is and does, not by the industrial function of those who pay the interest.

The intrinsic or individual grounds upon which the capitalist's right to interest has been defended are mainly three: productivity, service, and abstinence. We shall consider them in this order.

It is sometimes assumed that the claim of the capitalist to interest is quite as good as that of the owner of an animal to its offspring. Both, we are assured, are the products of the owner's property. In two respects, however, the comparison is inadequate, and somewhat misleading. Since the owner of a female animal contributes labor or money or both toward her care during the period of gestation, his claim to the offspring is based in part at least upon those titles, and only in part upon the title of interest. In the second place, the offspring is the definite and easily distinguishable product of its parent. But the sixty dollars obtained as interest on ten shares of railway stock cannot be identified as the exact product of one thousand dollars worth of railway property. It is impossible to know whether this amount of capital has contributed more, or less, than the sixty dollars of value to the joint product of the factors of production which are necessary to the creation of railway services. A similar statement will be true of any other share or piece of concrete capital. We know only that the interest received by the capitalist, be it five, six, seven, or some other per cent., measures the share of the product which capital commands for its owner in the present conditions of industry. It is the conventional not the actual product of capital.

Another faulty analogy is that drawn between the productivity of capital and the productivity of labor. Following the terminology of the economists, most persons think of land,

labor, and capital as productive in the same sense. Hence the productivity of capital is easily assumed to have the same moral value as the productive action of human beings; and the right of the capitalist to a part of the product is put on the same moral basis as the right of the laborer. Yet the differences between the two kinds of productivity, and between the two moral claims to the product are more important than their resemblances.

In the first place, there is an essential physical difference. As an instrument of production, labor is active, capital is passive. As regards its worth or dignity, labor is the expenditure of human energy, the output of a *person,* while capital is a material thing, standing apart from a personality, and possessing no human quality or human worth. These significant intrinsic or physical differences forbid any immediate inference that the moral claims of the owners of capital and labor are equally valid. We should logically expect to find that their moral claims are unequal.

This expectation is realized when we examine the bearing of the two kinds of productivity upon human welfare. In the exercise of productive effort the average laborer undergoes a sacrifice. He is engaged in a process that is ordinarily irksome. To require from him this toilsome expenditure of energy without compensation, would make him a mere instrument of his fellows. It would subordinate him and his comfort to the aggrandizement of beings who are not his superiors but his moral equals. For he is a person; they are no more than persons. On the other hand, the capitalist as such, as the recipient of interest, performs no labor, painful or otherwise. Not the capitalist but capital participates in the productive process. Even though the capitalist should receive no interest, the productive functioning of capital would not subordinate him to his fellows in the way that wageless labor would subordinate the laborer.

The precise and fundamental reason for according to the laborer his product is that this is the only rational rule of distribution. When a man makes a useful thing out of materials that are his, he has a strict right to the product simply because

there is no other reasonable method of distributing the goods and opportunities of the earth. If another individual, or society, were permitted to take this product, industry would be discouraged, idleness fostered, and reasonable life and self-development rendered impossible. Direful consequences of this magnitude would not follow the abolition of interest.

Perhaps the most important difference between the moral claims of capitalist and laborer is the fact that for the latter labor is the sole means of livelihood. Unless he is compensated for his product he will perish. But the capitalist has in addition to the interest that he receives the ability to work. Were interest abolished he would still be in as good a position as the laborer. The product of the laborer means to him the necessaries of life; the product of the capitalist means to him goods in excess of a mere livelihood. Consequently their claims to the product are greatly unequal in vital importance and moral value.

The foregoing considerations show that even the claim of the laborer to his product is not based upon merely intrinsic grounds. It does not spring entirely from the mere fact that he has produced the product, from the mere relation between producer and thing produced. If this is true of labor-productivity we should expect to find it even more evident with regard to the productivity of capital; for the latter is passive instead of active, non-rational instead of human.

The expectation is well founded. Not a single conclusive argument can be brought forward to show that the productivity of capital directly and necessarily confers upon the capitalist a right to the interest-product. All the attempted arguments are reducible to two formulas: "res fructificat domino" ("a thing fructifies to its owner") and "the effect follows its cause." The first of these was originally a legal rather than an ethical maxim; a rule by which the title was determined in the civil law, not a principle by which the right was determined in morals. The second is an irrelevant platitude. As a juristic principle, neither is self evident. Why should the owner of a piece of capital, be it a house, a machine, or a share of railway stock, have a right to its product, when he has expended neither time, labor, money, nor inconvenience of any kind?

To answer, "because the thing which produced the product belongs to him," is merely to beg the question. To answer, "because the effect follows the cause," is to make a statement which may or may not be true, but which has nothing to do with the question. What we want to know is why the ownership of a productive thing gives a right to the product; why this particular effect should follow its cause in this particular way. To answer by repeating under the guise of sententious formulas the thesis that is to be proved, is scarcely satisfactory or convincing. To answer that if the capitalist were not given interest industry and thrift would decrease and human welfare suffer, is to abandon the intrinsic argument entirely. It brings in the extrinsic consideration of social consequences.

The second intrinsic ground upon which interest is defended, is the *service* performed by the capitalist when he permits his capital to be used in production. Without capital, laborers and consumers would be unable to command more than a fraction of their present means of livelihood. From this point of view we see that the service in question is worth all that is paid in the form of interest. Nevertheless it does not follow that the capitalist has a claim in strict justice to any payment for this service. According to St. Thomas, a seller may not charge a buyer an extra amount merely because of the extra value attached to the community by the latter. ("Secunda Secundae," q. 77, a. 1, in corp.). In other words, a man cannot justly be required to pay an unusual price for a benefit or advantage or service when the seller undergoes no unusual privation. Father Lehmkuhl carries the principle farther, and declares that the seller has a right to compensation only when and to the extent that he undergoes a privation or undertakes a responsibility ("Theologia Moralis," 1, no. 1050). According to this rule, the capitalist would have no right to interest; for as mere interest-receiver he undergoes no privation. His risk and labor are remunerated in profits, while the responsibility of not withdrawing from production something that can continue in existence only by continuing in production, is scarcely deserving of a reward according to the canons of strict justice.

Whatever we may think of this argument from authority,

we find it impossible to prove objectively that a man who renders a service to another has an intrinsic right to anything beyond compensation for the expenditure of money or labor involved in performing the service. The man who throws a life preserver to a drowning person may justly demand a payment for his trouble. On any recognized basis of compensation, this payment will not exceed a few dollars. Yet the man whose life is in danger would pay a million dollars for this service if he were extremely rich. He would regard the service as worth this much to him. Has the man with the life preserver a right to exact such a payment? Has he the right to demand the full value of the service? No reasonable person would answer this question otherwise than in the negative. If the performer of the service may not charge the full value thereof, as measured by the estimate put upon it by the recipient, it would seem that he ought not to demand anything in excess of a fair price for his trouble. In other words, he may not justly exact anything for the service as such.

It would seem, then, that the capitalist has no moral claim to pure interest on the mere ground that the use of his capital in production constitutes a service to laborers and consumers. It would seem that he has no right to demand a payment for a costless service.

The third and last of the intrinsic justifications of interest that we shall consider is *abstinence*. This argument is based upon the contention that the person who saves his money, and invests it in the instruments of production undergoes a sacrifice in deferring to the future satisfactions that he might enjoy today. One hundred dollars now is worth as much as one hundred and five dollars a year hence. That is, when both are estimated from the viewpoint of the present. This sacrifice of present to future enjoyment which contributes a service to the community in the form of capital, creates a just claim upon the community to compensation in the form of interest. If the capitalist is not rewarded for this inconvenience he is, like the unpaid laborer, subordinated to the aggrandizement of his fellows.

Against this argument we may place the extreme refutation attempted by the Socialist leader, Ferdinand Lassalle:

"But the profit of capital is *the reward of abstinence.* Truly a happy phrase. European millionaires are ascetics, Indian penitents, modern St. Simons Stylites, who, perched on their columns, with withered features and arms and bodies thrust forward, hold out a plate to the passers-by that they may receive the wages of their privations! In the midst of this sacrosanct group, high above his fellow-mortifiers of the flesh, stands the Holy House of Rothschild. That is the real truth about our present society! How could I have hitherto blundered on this point as I have?" ("What is Capital?" p. 27).

Obviously this a marvelously one-sided implication concerning the sources of capital. But it is scarcely less adequate than the explanation in opposition to which it has been quoted. Both fail to distinguish between the different kinds of savers, the different kinds of capital-owners. For the purpose of our inquiry savings must be divided into three classes.

First, those which are accumulated and invested automatically. Very rich persons save a great deal of money that they have no desire to spend, since they have already satisfied or safeguarded all the wants of which they are conscious. Evidently this kind of saving involves no real sacrifice. To it the words of Lassalle are substantially applicable, and the claim to interest for abstinence decidedly inapplicable.

Second, savings to provide for old age and other future contingencies which are estimated as more important than any of the purposes for which the money might now be expended. Were interest abolished this kind of saving would be even greater than it is at present; for a larger total would be required to equal the fund that is now provided through the addition of interest to the principal. In a no-interest regime one thousand dollars would have to be set aside every year in order to total twenty thousand dollars in twenty years; when interest is accumulated on the savings, a smaller annual amount will suffice to produce the same fund. Inasmuch as this class of persons would save in an even greater degree without interest,

it is clear that they regard the sacrifice involved as fully compensated in the resulting provision for the future. In their case sacrifice is amply rewarded by accumulation. Their claim to additional compensation in the form of interest does not seem to have any valid basis. In the words of the late Professor Devas, "there is ample reward given without any need of any interest or dividend. For the workers with heads or hands keep the property intact, ready for the owner to consume whenever convenient, when he gets infirm or sick, or when his children have grown up, and can enjoy the property with him" ("Political Economy," p. 507).

The third kind of saving is that which is made by persons who could spend and have some desire to spend, more on present satisfactions, and who have already provided for all future wants in accordance with the standards of necessaries and comforts that they have adopted. Their fund for the future is already sufficient to meet all those needs which seem weightier than their present unsatisfied wants. If the surplus in question is saved it will go to supply future desires which are no more important than those for which it might be expended now. In other words, the alternatives before the prospective saver are to procure a given amount of satisfaction today, or to defer the same degree of satisfaction to a distant day.

In this case the inducement of interest will undoubtedly be necessary to bring about saving. As between equal amounts of satisfaction at different times, the average person will certainly prefer those of the present to those of the future. He will not decide in favor of the future unless the satisfactions then obtainable are to be greater in quantity. To this situation the rule that deferred enjoyments are worth less than present enjoyments, is strictly applicable. The increased quantity of future satisfaction which is necessary to turn the choice from the present to the future, and to determine that the surplus shall be saved rather than spent, can be provided only through interest. In this way the accumulations of interest and savings will make the future fund equivalent to a larger amount of enjoyment or utility than could be obtained if the surplus were exchanged

for the goods of the present. "Interest magnifies the distant object." Whenever this magnifying power seems sufficiently great to outweigh the advantage of present over future satisfactions, the surplus will be saved instead of spent.

Among the well-to-do there is probably a considerable number of persons who take this attitude toward a considerable part of their savings. Since they would not make these savings without the inducement of interest, they regard the latter as a necessary compensation for the sacrifice of postponed enjoyment. In a general way we may say that they have a strict right to this interest on the intrinsic ground of sacrifice. Inasmuch as the community benefits by the savings, it may quite as fairly be required to pay for the antecedent sacrifices of the savers as for the inconvenience undergone by the performer of any other useful labor or service. To be sure, the community could abolish interest without violating this particular right to interest; for the persons in question would already have received compensation for the sacrifices of past saving, and could refrain from further saving of this kind; but so long as they continue to save solely for the sake of the interest that they receive, their title to the latter is just.

Summing up the matter regarding the intrinsic justification of interest, we find that the titles of productivity and service do not conclusively establish the strict right of the capitalist to interest, and that the title of abstinence is morally valid for only a portion, probably a rather small portion of the total amount of interest now received by the owners of capital. Consequently interest as a whole is not justified on individual grounds. If it is to be proved morally lawful its justification must be sought in extrinsic and social considerations. This inquiry will form the subject of a second article.

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THE MALTHUSIAN PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION.

The Malthusian doctrine, which undertakes to state the relation between increasing food supply and increasing population, and the means by which that relation is maintained, was long the bulwark behind which reactionaries in England took their stand to beat off the attacks of reform. "We want higher wages," said the workers. "You cannot by any possibility get them so long as your numbers continue to increase," answered the propertied classes. "Your low wages are due to no fault of ours or of the state's, but to your own imprudence." Malthusianism, interpreted in this way, was a balm to the consciences of the well-to-do classes, but it made political economy the dismal science.

Certain zealous but misguided reformers accepted the prevailing version of Malthusianism and recommended to the workers a course of conduct intended for their material well being, but in violation of the principles of morality. A new storm of disapproval arose. The Malthusian doctrine was now not only an object of controversy between the propertied and the propertyless classes, but between the moralists and the immoral reformers as well.

Malthus's essay has been refuted, it is said, more often than any other economic work. And yet, many of the foremost economists profess themselves followers of Malthus. The late General Walker, for example, after accepting the Malthusian doctrine of population, said (*Political Economy*, p. 313), "Mr. Malthus unquestionably committed some errors of statement and faults of reasoning in his original enunciation of the principles of population, as is likely to be the case on the first promulgations of great economic or social laws; and during his whole life he was closely followed by criticism and abuse. Since Mr. Malthus's death has taken all personal interest out of the controversy over the principles of population, and Malthusianism has come to be merely a name for a body of

doctrine, the views here presented have been a butt for the headless arrows of beginners in economics and of sundry sentimental sociologists."

Professor Taussig in his recent work (*Principles of Economics,* p. 210), likewise tones down and accepts Malthus. "Some parts of Malthus's teaching have been sustained by the course of thought since his time. Man is an animal, physiologically like any other; and the possibilities of his increase in numbers are as unlimited as they are for any other form of life. It is an odd circumstance that Darwin, reading Malthus's Essay, was led to the reflection that not man only, but any sort of creature, has the possibility of indefinite increase; and hence reached the conclusion that there is an increasing struggle for room and sustenance, and a survival of those best able to cope with their surroundings. Darwin's own wider conclusion, then, reinforced Malthus's views as to the human species." And later on Taussig adds, "The tendency towards increase in population must then be counteracted; and it may be counteracted in two ways, to which Malthus gave the names positive and preventive checks. By positive checks he meant those which cut down numbers already brought into the world,—starvation, disease, war, misery in all its forms. By preventive checks he meant those which prevent numbers from being brought into the world."

Many Catholic writers are disposed to hold Malthus responsible for the immoral interpretation placed upon his writings by certain of his followers; and even where they do not press this responsibility, they are not as much inclined as the economists above quoted, to tolerate the evident mistakes in Malthus's Essay, and to give him credit for what is sound. Father Schrijvers, after discussing the economic side of the question, takes up the moral phase. "As to the *remedies advised* by Malthus," he says, "for this economic state of things, so disastrous to the future of humanity, they are inadmissable. . . . Now an economic doctrine that leads to the violation of the rules of morality is false."

Malthusianism was in the beginning a protest against economic optimism, and it is not strange that economic optimism

continues to oppose it. If misery and want are due, as many reformers insist, to injustice in the distribution of wealth, and not at all to the niggardliness of nature, then it is incorrect to say with Malthus that nature, through the scantiness of her gifts, sets bounds to the numbers of population. Henry George represents this view. "I go to the heart of the matter," he says, "in saying that there is no warrant, either in experience or analogy, for the assumption that there is any tendency in population to increase faster than subsistence." And again he writes, "Nor what Malthus failed to show has any one since him shown. The globe may be surveyed and history may be reviewed in vain for any instance of a considerable country in which poverty and want can be fairly attributed to the pressure of an increasing population."

It is the purpose of the writer in the following pages to examine this much debated principle of population, giving (I) an outline of the main features of the Malthusian principle, and some account of the sources from which Malthus derived his views, and (II) a critical estimate of the theory and of its importance in so far as it is valid.

I.

In 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus, an Anglican clergyman, published anonymously "An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the Future Improvement of Society. With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers." The preface to the first edition of the essay states that "the following essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend on the subject of Mr. Godwin's Essay, on avarice and profusion, in his Enquirer. The discussion started the general question of the future improvement of society; and the author at first sat down with an intention of merely stating his thoughts to his friend, upon paper, in a clearer manner than he thought he could do in conversation. But as the subject opened upon him, some ideas occurred, which he did not recollect to have met with before; and as he conceived that every, the least light, on a topic so generally

interesting, might be received with candour, he determined to put his thoughts in a form for publication." The friend of whom he speaks in the preface was his father, the literary executor of Rousseau and the friend of Godwin. The first edition of the essay was intended to be a refutation of Godwin's argument for the perfectibility of mankind. The second edition was published in 1803 under the author's name and was called "An Essay on the Principle of Population; or, a view of its past and present effects on human happiness; with an inquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils which it occasions. A New Edition, Very Much Enlarged." There were in all, six editions of the Essay published during Malthus's life and in the case of each new edition some revision was made. The first essay was extremely pessimistic in tone in answer to the extreme optimism of Godwin. The later editions were less extreme and left more room for a hopeful view of the future.

Godwin held that the evil in the world is essentially the result of human institutions. By establishing equality among men, by training men to use their reason and by abolishing evil laws and institutions, Godwin would usher in the day when all would be happy and all would have leisure in which to develop their moral and intellectual powers. Malthus considered Godwin's presentation of the matter a beautiful dream which he would like to see realized but which was impossible of realization because of qualities inherent in the nature of man. Godwin in speaking of population says, "There is a principle in human society, by which population is perpetually kept down to the level of the means of subsistence. Thus among the wandering tribes of America, and Asia, we never find through the lapse of ages that population has so increased as to render necessary the cultivation of the earth." Godwin did not further investigate this principle, but Malthus did, and professed to find in it the reason why Godwin's dream could not come true. "This principle of population," said Malthus, "will be found to be the grinding law of necessity; misery and the fear of misery."

It is this principle of population which is the theme of the

Essay. Roughly stated, Malthus's contention is as follows: The power of population is greater than the power in the earth to furnish subsistence for men. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. By the law of our nature that makes food necessary for men, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand. She has been comparatively sparing in the room, and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in one spot of earth, with ample food and ample room to expand in, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious, all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law. And the race of man cannot, by any efforts of reason, escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death, among mankind, misery and vice. The former, misery, is an absolutely necessary consequence of it. Vice is a highly probable consequence, and we therefore see it abundantly prevail; but it ought not, perhaps, to be called an absolutely necessary consequence since it is the part of virtue to resist all temptation to evil.

This natural inequality in the two powers of population and of production in the earth, together with the fact that the two inequalities must be kept equal, *i. e.*, that man cannot live without food, form the insurmountable difficulty in the way of the perfectibility of society in which Godwin believed.

Population when unchecked increases in a geometrical ratio and subsistence in an arithmetical ratio. In the United States of America, where the means of subsistence have been more ample, the manners of the people more pure, and consequently the checks to early marriages fewer, than in any of the modern states of Europe, the population was found, according to the best of Malthus's information, to double itself in twenty-five

years. This ratio of increase, though short of the utmost power of population to reproduce itself, was taken as the standard from which to reckon. Population, then, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, when unchecked, *i. e.,* it increases in geometrical ratio.

Now consider the possibility of the increase of food: Take any spot of earth, Great Britain, for instance, and see in what ratio the subsistence it affords can be supposed to increase, beginning with it under its present state of cultivation.

If I allow, says Malthus, that by the best possible policy, by breaking up more land, and by great encouragements to agriculture, the produce of this island may be doubled in the first twenty-five years, I think it will be allowing as much as any person can well demand.

In the next twenty-five years, it is impossible to suppose that the produce could be quadrupled. It would be contrary to all our knowledge of the qualities of land. The very utmost that we can conceive, is, that the increase in the second twenty-five years might equal the present produce. Let us then take this for our rule, though certainly far beyond the truth; and allow that by great exertion, the whole produce of the Island, might be increased every twenty-five years, by a quantity of subsistence equal to what it at present produces. The most enthusiastic speculator cannot suppose a greater increase than this. In a few centuries it would make every acre of land in the Island like a garden. Yet this ratio of increase is evidently arithmetical.

Supposing we could have these two ratios of increase without check, the human species would increase in the ratio of—1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, etc., and the subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, etc. In two centuries and a quarter the population would be to the means of subsistence as 512 to 10; in three centuries, as 4096 to 13; and in two thousand years the difference would be almost incalculable, though the produce in that time would have increased to an immense extent.

Of course it is out of the question that population should thus increase out of proportion to the increase of the means of sub-

sistence. Accordingly Malthus undertakes to examine the checks which keep population from increasing so rapidly. He first discusses the check on the lower forms of life. Among plants and animals, he says, the view of the subject is simple. They are all impelled by a powerful instinct to the increase of their species; and this instinct is interrupted by no reasoning, or doubts about providing for their offspring. Wherever there is liberty, therefore, the power of increase is exerted; and the superabundant effects are repressed afterwards by want of room and nourishment, which is common to animals and plants; and among animals, by becoming the prey of others.

The effects of this check on man are more complicated. Impelled to the increase of his species by an equally powerful instinct, reason interrupts his career, and asks him whether he may not bring beings into the world, for whom he cannot provide the means of subsistence. In a state where all men might enjoy equally the fruits of the earth, this would be a simple question. In the present state of society other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank in life? Will he not subject himself to greater difficulties than he at present feels? Will he not be obliged to labor harder, and if he has a large family, will his utmost exertions enable him to support them? May he not see his offspring in rags and misery, and clamoring for bread that he cannot give them? And may he not be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting his independence, and being obliged to the sparing hand of charity for support? These considerations are calculated to prevent, and certainly do prevent, a very great number in all civilized nations from pursuing the dictates of nature in an early attachment to one woman. And this restraint almost necessarily, though not absolutely, produces vice. Yet in all societies, even those that are most vicious, the tendency to a virtuous attachment is so strong that there is a constant effort towards the increase of population. The result of this tendency means increased consumption of food in that society and therefore constantly tends to subject the lower classes of the society to distress, and to prevent any great permanent amelioration of their condition.

Malthus concludes that the superior power of population cannot be checked without producing misery or vice, and Godwin's argument of the perfectibility of man is no longer tenable. At any rate, that was Malthus's conclusion in the first edition of the Essay. Later editions show a modification of this opinion.

The second and succeeding editions of the Essay differed, in important respects from the first edition. The later editions contained much material gathered from the different quarters of the earth to show the conditions under which population had actually increased. This material was not, however, essential to the argument, and may be neglected. The most important changes were that the Essay ceased to be mainly a refutation of Godwinism and that it introduced a new check on population. The checks of the first Essay were vice and misery; in the later editions there was added the check of moral restraint. Malthus explains this term as follows: "It will be observed that I here use the term *moral* in its most confined sense. By moral restraint I would be understood to mean a restraint from marriage from prudential motives, with a conduct strictly moral during this period of restraint; and I have never intentionally deviated from this sense. When I have wished to consider the restraint from marriage unconnected with its consequences, I have either called it prudential restraint, or a part of the preventive check, of which indeed it forms the principal branch. . . . In my review of the different stages of society, I have been accused of not allowing sufficient weight in the prevention of population to moral restraint; but when the confined sense of the term, which I have here explained, is adverted to, I am fearful that I shall not be found to have erred much in this respect. I should be glad to believe myself mistaken."

Malthus also has another classification of checks on population, viz., the positive and the preventive. Positive checks are those which cut down an existing population and preventive checks are those arising from man's calculation of future consequences which do not allow so large a number of births as there would be if a man followed his animal instincts alone.

The preventive checks may be either moral or immoral. It has been unfortunate for Malthus's memory that a group of persons calling themselves neo-Malthusians and advocating preventive checks of an immoral nature, have been able to mislead the public as to what he really taught. Malthus never advocated checks of an immoral nature.

Malthus appeared in England at a time when a pessimistically colored explanation of the principle of population was likely to be received with favor. The population of England had been increasing rapidly. In 1700 it was in the neighborhood of five millions; in 1750, six and a half millions; and in 1800, nine millions; while in the next fifty years it doubled itself. For the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, England's food production was able to maintain the home population and to furnish a surplus for shipment abroad. For another decade or two, the balance between home supply of food and demand remained nearly equal; while beginning in the last decade of the eighteenth it became necessary to get larger shipments of grain abroad. The burden caused by this necessity of going to foreign markets for food was accentuated by several successive crop failures and by the weight of foreign war. At the same time the industrial revolution which was under way, had worked great hardship to the craftsmen of the earlier generation, inasmuch as they were unable to fit themselves into the new system. The new factories were able to use cheap child- and woman-labor, and when men were employed, it was often at less than a living wage; and the poor rates were beginning to take the place of wages. The result of all these conditions was a wide-spread pauperization of the laboring classes, and so under these circumstances, a pessimistic philosophy of population was well-timed.

In the preface to the second edition of the "Essay," Malthus discusses his sources. The "Essay on the Principle of Population," which was published in 1798, was suggested, he says, by a paper in Mr. Godwin's "Enquirer." The only authors from whom he deduced the principle which formed the main arguments of the essay were Hume, Wallace, Dr. Adam Smith, and Dr. Price. Before getting out the second edition of the

essay he had gone more deeply into the literature of population and had become acquainted with the writings on the subject by some of the physiocrats and with those of Montesquieu, Dr. Franklin, Sir James Steuart, Mr. Arthur Young, and Mr. Townsend. Much had been written on the subject and looking into the situation Malthus was a little surprised that what had been written was so little known. In fact, practically everything of importance that Malthus had said in his essay had been said once or many times by previous writers, but Malthus put the case in a more striking way, presented it with more conviction and at a time when social conditions were such that people were more likely to pay attention to it. He gives his own idea of his contribution in the following language: "Independently of the comparison between the increase of population and food, which had not perhaps been stated with sufficient force and precision; some of the most curious and interesting parts of the subject had been either wholly omitted or treated very slightly. Though it had been stated distinctly, that population must always be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence; yet few inquiries had been made into the various modes by which this level is effected; and the principle had never been sufficiently pursued to its consequences: and those practical inferences drawn from it, which a strict examination of its effects on society seems to suggest." The judgment of the world is likely to be, however, that Malthus overestimated the importance of the new matter which he had contributed. A few extracts from some of his predecessors will show that the matter was pretty well understood before his time. First let us call as witnesses the authors whom he had read before the publication of the first edition.

David Hume and Robert Wallace were interested in the question of the relative numbers of people in ancient and in modern times, the former holding that the ancients were less numerous, the latter that they were more numerous than the moderns. Both were acquainted with the problem of population, but they were not pessimistic as to its outcome. Hume in his Dissertation on the "Populousness of Ancient Nations," published in 1753, devotes much space to a discussion of the

checks on increase of population, enumerating among them disease and vice, slavery and war. Concerning the tendency to increase, Hume says: "For as there is in all men, both male and female, a desire and power of generation, more active than is ever universally exerted, the restraints which they lie under must proceed from some difficulties in their situation, which it belong to a wise legislation carefully to observe and remove. . . . History tells us frequently of plagues which have swept away the third or fourth part of a people; yet in a generation or two, the destruction was not perceived, and the society had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the riches acquired, enabled the people who escaped, immediately to marry and to rear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished."

Dr. Wallace, in 1753, treated both of the geometrical rate of increase and of the checks on the increase of population. In his "Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Ancient and Modern Times" he first makes the assumption that "every marriage produces six children, three males and as many females; two of whom, *viz.*, one male and one female, die in the more early seasons of life, or before marriage: according to which four will remain to marry, and to replenish the world. That in 33⅓ years from the time when this original pair began to propagate, they shall have produced their six children; and that within the second period of 33⅓ years, each of the succeeding couples shall have produced six children; and this to take place continually." According to this assumption the population would be doubled every 33⅓ years, but this, Wallace concludes, is inconsistent with fact for the reason that mankind would have overstocked the earth long before the deluge if this rate of increase had been maintained. And we read in a footnote: "It is not owing to the want of prolific virtue, but to the distressed circumstances of mankind, that every generation does not more than double themselves; for this would be the case, if every man were married at the age of puberty, and could sufficiently provide for a family.

The checks to the increase of population Wallace developed

with considerable detail. The following extracts will give an indication of his contribution to Malthus. "The causes of this paucity of inhabitants, and of this irregularity of increase, are manifold. Some of them may be called physical, as they depend entirely upon the course of nature, and are independent of mankind. Others are moral and depend on the affections, the passions, and the institutions of men. Among the physical causes some are more constant: such as the temperature of the air. . . . Other causes of this kind are more variable: such as, the inclemency of particular seasons; plagues; famines; earthquakes; and inundations of the sea. . . . Those we have called moral causes . . . arise from the passions and the vices of men . . . and have a more constant and more powerful influence on the world.

"To this last article we may refer the many destructive wars which men have waged against one another; great poverty; corrupt institutions either of a civil or of a religious kind; intemperance; debauchery; irregular amours; idleness; luxury; and whatever either prevents marriage, or weakens the generating faculties of men, or renders them either negligent or incapable of educating their children, and of cultivating the earth to advantage. . . . In every country there shall always be found a greater number of inhabitants, *caeteris paribus,* in proportion to the plenty of provisions it affords, as plenty will always encourage the generality of the people to marry."

Adam Smith recognized that the means of subsistence furnish a sort of elastic check on population. Thus, he says, (*Wealth of Nations,* I, viii, published in 1776), "A greater number of fine children, however, is seldom seen anywhere than about a barrack of soldiers. Very few of them, it seems, arrive at the age of thirteen or fourteen. In some places one half the children born die before they are four years of age; in many places before they are seven; and in almost all places before they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however, will everywhere be found chiefly among the children of the common people, who cannot afford to tend them with the same care as those of better station. Though their marriages are generally more fruitful than those of people of fashion, a smaller pro-

portion of their children arrive at maturity. . . . Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilized society it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce."

Richard Price in a letter written to Benjamin Franklin in 1769 alludes to the rapid rate in increase in America. This letter was known to Malthus and is to be found in the second volume of Price's Observations on Reversionary Payments. "Dr. Herberden," says Price, "observes that, in Madeira, the inhabitants double their own number in 84 years. But this, (as you, Sir, well know), is a very slow increase, compared with that which takes place among our colonies in America. In the back settlements, where the inhabitants apply themselves entirely to agriculture, and luxury is not known, they double their own number in 15 years; and all through the northern colonies, in 25 years. This is an instance of increase so rapid as to have scarcely any parallel."

The physiocrats with whose writings Malthus had become acquainted before the publication of the second edition had given careful thought to many phases of the population question. While Mirabeau had taken a very optimistic view of the relation between population and subsistence, Quesnay thought that population might press so closely upon subsistence as to produce misery. DuPont discussed the doubling of the population every twenty-five years in America. In general the physiocrats held that advancing civilization with its improvements and inventions makes the conditions of life easier for the increasing population.

Montesquieu devotes Book XXIII of the "Spirit of Laws" (1748) to a discussion of the question of population. After a historical survey of the laws and the conditions of ancient and modern times he says, "From all this we may conclude that Europe is at present in a condition to require laws to be made in favor of the propagation of the human species."

Benjamin Franklin, in a short essay entitled " Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.", (1751) discusses the checks upon population and concludes as follows, " There is, in short, no bound to the prolific nature of plants or animals but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's means of subsistence. Was the face of the earth vacant of other plants, it might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind only; as for instance, with Fennel; and were it empty of other inhabitants, it might in a few ages be replenished from one nation only; as for instance with Englishmen. Thus there are supposed to be now upwards of one Million English souls in North America (tho' 'tis thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea) and yet perhaps there is not one the fewer in Britain, but rather many more, on account of the employment the colonies afford to manufacture at home. This Million doubling, suppose but once in twenty-five years, will in another century be more than the people of England, and the greatest number of Englishmen will be on this side the water. . . . Thus, if you have room and subsistence enough, as you may by dividing, make ten polypuses out of one, you may of one make ten nations, equally populous and powerful; or rather, increase a nation ten fold in numbers and strength."

Sir James Steuart in his " Principles of Political Oeconomy, etc.", (1767) compares the multiplication of the human species with that of animals and finds the situations similar. " Several kinds of animals, especially insects, multiply by thousands, and yet the species does not appear annually to increase. . . It is reasonable to conclude that what destroys such vast quantities must be among other causes, the want of food." In the case of men " the generative faculty resembles a spring with a loaded weight, which always exerts itself in proportion to the diminution of resistance; when food has remained some time without augmentation or diminution the spring is overpowered: the force of it becomes less than nothing, inhabitants will diminish at least in proportion to the overcharge. If upon the other hand food be increased the spring will exert itself in proportion as the resistance diminishes; people will begin to be

better fed; they will multiply, and in proportion as they increase in numbers, the food will become scarce again."

Arthur Young wrote in 1771 in "The Farmer's Tour through the East of England," "In spite of the assertions of all political writers for the last twenty years, who placed the prosperity of a nation in the greatest possible population, an excessive population without a great amount of work and without abundant production is a devouring surplus for a state; for this excessive population does not get the benefits of subsistence which, without this excess, they would partake of; the amount of work is not sufficient for the number of hands; and the price of work is lowered by the great competition of the laborers, from which results indigence to those who cannot find work."

Joseph Townsend writing in 1792 ("Journey through Spain") said, "There is an appetite which is, and should be, urgent but which, if left to operate without restraint would multiply the human species before provision could be made for their support. Some check, some balance, is therefore absolutely needful, and hunger is the proper balance; hunger, not as directly felt or feared by the individual for himself, but as foreseen and feared for his immediate offspring. Were it not for this, the equilibrium would not be preserved so near as it is at present, between the numbers of people and the quantity of food."

The extracts given above typify the views of the writers named by Malthus as the sources of his inspiration. There is nothing essential in his argument which is not foreshadowed by one or more of them. Many other writers from Plato and Aristotle down to his own time had gone over this same ground more or less thoroughly. But for the most part the earlier writers on population looked upon the tendency of increasing numbers with satisfaction rather than with fear. Here was for them the means of making good the losses caused by famine and war rather than the cause of vice and misery. And especially with the growth of modern nations, statesmen were inclined to consider and to encourage the numbers of potential soldiers. There were not wanting, however, writers who took

the opposed view. We cannot refrain from calling attention to one of these, the Italian Ortes, whose work on population published eight years before that of Malthus and in certain respects superior to the Essay, was unknown to the English divine.

Giammaria Ortes [1] was a native of Venice and there entered the Camaldolese order where he took vows. Later, upon the death of his father and at the earnest solicitation of his mother he withdrew from the order and devoted himself to the management of the family fortune. His later life was given over to a wide range of study and he published upon a number of varied subjects. His economic doctrines were marked by originality, and he delighted in attacking the received economic opinion of his day. He died in 1790 at the age of seventy-seven. He develops his views on population in his "Economia nazionale" and especially in the "Riflessioni sulla popolazione della nazioni par rapporto all' Economia nazionale," published in 1790.

According to Ortes, man's power of increase is unlimited. He illustrates this by supposing a group of seven persons composed of a grand-parent, two parents, and two young men and two young women twenty years old. The two young couples marry and there are born to each couple an average of six children, of whom two die before reaching the age of twenty. Their great-grandfather also dies. Thirty years after the marriage of the first two couples, there will remain alive the two parents mentioned in the original group of seven, the two young couples of that period and eight children, or a total of fourteen. If this cycle is repeated every thirty years, the population will be at the end of the second period of thirty years, twenty-eight; at the end of the third thirty year period, fifty-six, at the end of the fourth period, one hundred twelve; and at the end of the fifth period, or one hundred fifty years after the marriage of the two original couples, two hundred twenty-four. This is Malthus's geometrical progression with the

[1] The account of Ortes here given is based upon that of Reynaud in "La Theorie de la Population en Italie du XVIe au XVIIIe Siècle."

difference that Malthus assumed that population might double every twenty-five years. Ortes continues his progression with the result that he finds that at the end of seven hundred fifty years the original group of seven had become 234,881,024, and a hundred and fifty years later 7,516,192,768. But according to Ortes, the earth can support only three billions of inhabitants. The original group of seven would thus in about eight hundred years reach the limit permitted by the productive powers of the earth. Ortes differs from Malthus in thinking of the limit of the supply of food as being rigid, whereas Malthus considered it somewhat elastic and believed that with the passing of time, the food supply could be increased. On the other hand, Ortes did not consider that the number of inhabitants would actually increase to three billions. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth, he thought, would keep the population down very considerably. He estimated the actual population of the world to be in the neighborhood of one billion and he thought it was held down to this number by the avarice of the wealthy who did not wish to have their property divided among many children and who by depriving the poor of their share of the national income, kept from them the means of rearing their children. When a population has nearly reached the limits set by the size and wealth of its territory it may become stationary in numbers, provided that the number of persons who marry is equalled by the number who remain single. And Ortes would advise celibacy to overcome the evils which arise from overpopulation. Only Catholics, he says, teach that celibacy is a virtue. It alone restricts suitably the numbers of marriages and hinders extreme poverty and excess of population. Without celibacy, the human species falls to the level of the brute. Like Malthus, Ortes discusses the checks upon increase among animals and among men, but he gives man more credit for a right use of his reason in the matter than does Malthus.

Malthus and his disciples used his theory as a justification and an argument for the hard-heartedness of the wealthy towards the poor. The poverty of the poor was due to their own folly, said Malthus, and it would not mend matters for the

wealthy to divide their goods with the less fortunate. Ortes, on the other hand, was filled with Christian charity and held that a more equal distribution of wealth would help to relieve a relative over-population.

The "principle of population" states what Malthus believed to be true with regard to the respective tendencies to increase of population and subsistence. It is not a statement of what he wished true in this regard. He would have liked to take, with Godwin, an optimistic view of the future of society, but he was convinced that the facts in the case would not warrant such a view. In the first edition he had no recommendations to make for the purpose of enabling society to escape the consequences of the "principle of population"; in the second and later editions he advocated "moral restraint" as a means of escape from the hardship resulting from the "principle." The question to be decided, then, in connection with Malthus's doctrine is not whether it is moral or immoral, but rather whether it is true or false, or rather to what extent it is true and to what extent false, and whether there are not counteracting tendencies which render Malthus's principle of little or no practical importance at the present time. These questions will be taken up in a later paper.

FRANK O'HARA.

THE PERSONALITY OF FRANCIS THOMPSON.

At last the world knows the complete story of Francis Thompson, whose life, edited by Everard Meynell, the son of his benefactor, has recently appeared. While it gives a more detailed account of the poet, it serves mainly to confirm impressions already known to the public through notices and memoirs contributed by his friends. It must have been the desire of his readers to possess a definitive portrait of him "in his habit as he lived," and their anticipation to feel the spell of a unique personality. Yet we learn from the biography that he lacked the personal magnetism and fascination which his poems might have led us to expect. He was too ineffectual a figure, too little of a flesh and blood reality, to exercise a potent charm or to compel admiration. This lack was due largely to the constant *malaise,* the low vitality of wretched health. Yet the poet gains rather than loses by the fuller presentation of his life. If we must forego the magic of a full-blooded personality, there remain the qualities of his shy genius which largely compensate. His very oddities endear him to us, and the virtues of reverence, gentleness and humility, which were dominant in him, are the abiding memories which remain as we close the book. These traits help to correct any adverse impressions, and remind us, when all is said, that the quality of sanctity which was mated with his song was not altogether dissociated from his life.

The fiction of moral degeneracy has been disposed of forever. Apart from his one weakness, which he shared with De Quincey and Mangan, Francis Thompson wore the white flower of a blameless life. The drama of his earthly existence was enacted only in the high courts of the imagination, and his poems reflect only the history of mental experience which had no counterpart in his actual conduct. In no sense, then, can his name be linked with those of the decadent school—Aubrey Beardsley, Ernest Dowson, Richard Middleton, and others still living. His

addiction to the stimulant which eventually became a necessity with him, though it cannot be condoned, was occasioned by a shattered constitution and physical disability. For this the poet paid the inevitable penalty of exclusion from the actuality of life and of those *faillances* of the will which made impossible the active practices of a naturally religious nature. If this indulgence heightened the splendor, it deepened the miseries of his life. It is pathetic to read of his growing isolation amid the unfolding careers of his friends—the lady of "Love in Dian's Lap," and the children of "Sister Songs"—whom he had idealized by his imperial imagination, and whom he would fain tether to him by some thread of song. But all in vain; for reality invaded his dream and claimed them from him against his and their will. Yet the world is the gainer by the gifts of a piercing vision and an unbodied imagination which, if it had little foothold on this work-a-day world, ranged alone towards the poles of spiritual experience, and was at home in the white realms of the supernatural.

Turning to the record of his youth we must confess that his early life, before he became known to his biographer, still remains vague and shadowy. This is due doubtless, to the impenetrable reticence of the poet, which underlay all his garrulity. He was born, the son of a doctor, in 1859 at Preston, Lancashire; in 1870 he entered Ushaw College, where he remained for seven years, and later studied medicine for eight years at Owens College, Manchester. The likeness presented of his boyhood at Ushaw and at Manchester is not developed, and remains at most only a negative. The delicate, sensitive boy made no marked impression on his school companions, with whom he had nothing in common, and who did not understand him, as one may read between the lines of his essay on Shelley. We note none of that boyish zest in sports and games (his interest in cricket was a mere velleity), nor those animal spirits and physical qualities which give a boy rank among his equals. He suffered from those disabilities which unfitted him for the priesthood to which he aspired, and for the medical profession for which his parents later intended him. His superiors testify to a dreamy temperament, a dilatoriness and physical in-

capacity which sought refuge from reality in the world of books, especially of the English classics, which he absorbed into his being. At Owens College were sown the seeds of the habit which lasted his lifetime. His failure in his medical studies was a foregone conclusion, and Thompson, in despair, drifted to London, beyond the ken of his parents who could do nothing further for him. Here the record of his career becomes vivid and poignant in detail. For more than two years —1885 to 1888—he underwent extreme privation in the pitiless struggle for existence, forced by want and hunger to undertake the most sordid tasks, and often to herd by night with the homeless outcasts of the metropolis on the Thames embankment, unable to afford a shelter from the inclemency of the weather. In his efforts to eke out a livelihood he became by turns colporteur for a bookseller, apprentice to a shoemaker, a bootblack, a vendor of newspapers and matches, and a caller of cabs at the doors of the theaters. The memories of his dereliction are preserved in a well-known passage of "Sister Songs," which relates how he was befriended in his hour of extremity by a street-girl, who passed darkling out of his life, only to tarry forever in literature as:

> "A child . . . . a spring-flower; but a flower
> Fallen from the budded coronal of Spring,
> And through the city-streets blown withering"—

while the moving poem "In no Strange Land" shows how the religious vision of the poet could light the darkest depths of human misery:

> "But (when so sad thou canst not sadder)
> Cry;—and upon thy so sore loss
> Shall shine the traffic of Jacob's ladder
> Pitched between Heaven and Charing Cross.
> Yea, in the night, my Soul, my daughter,
> Cry,—clinging Heaven by the hems;
> And lo, Christ walking on the water
> Not of Genesareth, but Thames!"

The wretchedness of his lot was cheered by his literary passions which he pursued under these harrowing circumstances. And always he was a haunter of the libraries until his extreme

shabbiness of attire caused his exclusion. At length an article —one of the productions (among them the exquisite "Dream-Tryst"), penned by him in the fervor of composition by the chance light of some book-stall or street-lamp—sent to Wilfrid Meynell, then editor of *Merrie England,* led, after sundry mishaps, to his discovery. Thenceforth the poet was cared for by one whose generosity ranks highest in the annals of literary patronage. After medical treatment and some months' respite from the roar and fever of London in the friary at Storrington, Thompson was received into the circle of his friends, and allowed, under kindly supervision, the wayward liberty which habit and idiosyncrasy had made indispensable. He was free to devote himself to his interests in literature, was given work as reviewer for the *Athenaeum,* and the *Academy,* and was introduced to contemporary writers, especially to Coventry Patmore, who was to have such influence on his kindred genius. It was under these favoring conditions that his best work was produced, and his life, always so uncertain, protracted until 1907, when he died of consumption.

Of his appearance and manner of life many characteristic glimpses are contributed to his biography by those who knew him. The odd figure, with the frayed brown ulster and "disastrous" hat which he always wore, grew to be a familiar sight on the London streets as he walked abstractedly, with his satchel of books, for review, to and from the offices of the periodicals. The variety of his literary interests, ranging from war to cricket, his seeming omniscience, his helplessness in trifles, his incapacity in money matters, his harmless loquacity, his pietistic tendencies, his inveterate unpunctuality, his indifference to his person and dress, as of one taking no more thought than lilies—all these traits have become in turn matter for amusing comment from observers. His vagaries made him the despair of a succession of honest landladies. A child-like simplicity made him a natural playmate of the children "Sylvia" and "Monica," whom he companioned and immortalized. One of the most delightful letters in the volume records his eager solicitude for his charges, whom he accompanied on a skating excursion. He had his measure of good spirits too, "a

laugh readier than a girl's"; and, that he was not lacking in humor, his occasional bulletins in doggerel to Everard would testify. Apart from his one besetting weakness, Thompson's character was of a child-like rectitude. The following dedication of his writings, which were all placed at the service of religion, only reflects the ardor and innocence of his life:

> "Last and first, O Queen Mary,
> Of thy white Immaculacy,
> If my work may profit aught,
> Fill with lilies every thought!
> I surmise
> What is white will then be wise."

Indeed, his utter gentleness and humility link him with his namesake St. Francis of Assisi, whose poetic nature he loved so much, and a little incident recorded by his biographer of the poet, recalls the Fioretti of the Saint:

"His little tragedy at New-buildings was a wasp-sting. Enmity had started some days before, when a wasp fell into his wine-glass. It got out and was staggering on the table, when I came upon the scene. Francis stood still, watching with fire in his eye. "You drunken brute," he said, with loud severity. But no wasp, drunken or respectable, would he kill, though he could be bitter. The next day he was stung, and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt holds it of faith that for all that summer, after the poet's malediction, no wasps buzzed in Sussex."

Interesting as are the circumstances of his career, they are almost negligible in the interpretation of the genius of one who lived so largely in the world of the imagination. It is not to this sorry chronicle of one so hopelessly impractical in the mechanics of life, but to his own works, that we must turn for an understanding of Thompson. For the broken purposes, frustrated in his life, are fulfilled in his writings. As Lewis Hinds says: "The real Thompson is he of the poems made in secret, —kin to his forbears, the mystical English poets." From all the disabling accidents of mortality his hieratic Muse soared to realms

> "Where seven-quired psalterings meet;
> And all the gods move with calm hand in hand,
> And eyes that know not trouble and the worm."

His poetic temperament had the rich sensuousness of Keats and Rossetti, chastened by a spiritual austerity. His was the religion of beauty, not mere earthly beauty like theirs, but beauty aspirational, "piercing with all its spirings of utterance into the Infinite." Not without pain, and trial, and travail of the spirit had such heights been won. Many of his poems echo the abandonment and alienation from life of this "poor thief of Song," while others, such as "The Dread of Height," and "By Reason of Thy Law," voice the spiritual desolation of the laureate poet of the bays and thorn-crown. He was an "anima naturaliter Catholica," to whom the outward shows of things were but the rubrics of the spirit, and whose singing-robe was a vestment. Nothing is so characteristic as his creed of the sacramental character of nature, and his conviction that "not Shelley, not Wordsworth himself, ever drew so close to the heart of Nature as did the Seraph of Assisi, who was so close to the Heart of God." His genius can be paralelled only by those two other Catholic mystics, Crashaw and Coventry Patmore. Of Crashaw he has the lush luxuriance of diction and imagery; like Coventry Patmore he traces the points of analogy between the human and the divine, and voices his view of the ascetic value of suffering in human life.

> "Sadness is beauty's savor, and pain is
> The exceeding keen edge of bliss."

His poetry has well been called the return of the nineteenth century to the spirit of Thomas à Kempis. As regards its form and expression, while it must be admitted that Thompson is in part a derivative poet, yet what he borrowed he mostly changed into something rich and strange. He has not always unerring artistry of metre and rhythm, and his diction is at times doubtful, though its strangeness often results from its seventeenth-century manner. But when theme and passion are fused in perfect music, as in the "Hound of Heaven," he is incomparable. In inspiration and vision, he remains one of the great poets of all time, and the supreme Catholic poet in English literature.

FLORENCE MOYNIHAN.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON.

In 1889 a young man—he was then thirty, and at thirty a philosopher is young—was defending his doctorate thesis in philosophy at the Sorbonne. The title of his thesis was "Les données immédiates de la conscience," literally "The Immediate Data of Consciousness," a work now famous, translated into many languages, and particularly into English under the title "Time and Free Will." Both the dissertation itself and its defense by the author were original, brilliant, and bristled with sparkling figures and metaphors suggestive of an uninterrupted succession of fireworks. At the close of the discussion, a member of the academic jury, Professor Ravaisson, complimented the candidate, and added: "I have not always been able to grasp your meaning, but, I have no doubt, Sir, you understood yourself." The new doctor was Henri Bergson, who during the twenty-five years that have since elapsed has occupied successively various important positions as professor in several colleges, Master of Conferences at the Ecole Normale (1898-1900), and since 1900 professor at the Collège de France. In 1901 he was elected to membership in the French Institute in the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, and on the 12th of February 1914, to membership in the French Academy as one of the forty "immortals." His main philosophical works — besides his doctorate dissertation — are "Matière et mémoire" (1896), and "L'évolution créatrice" (1907), both translated into English under the titles "Matter and Memory," and "Creative Evolution." To these must be added a number of articles, and a work on "Laughter: an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic."

It is not always an easy matter to follow the author's thought, and he has complained many a time of having been misunderstood. Of a report from professors in French colleges, who had been asked to state what influence Professor Bergson's doctrine had on their teaching, he himself said: "In the

theories which they attribute to me I recognize nothing as coming from me, nothing which I ever thought, taught, or wrote." (*Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie,* January 1908, pp. 20, 21.) Hence when we see that today Professor Bergson is hailed as one of the greatest living philosophers, that the hall in which he lectures is too small to accommodate all those who wish to hear him, that, not only in France but all over the world, his doctrine has many disciples and is a center of philosophical discussion, that his world-wide influence is universally recognized even by his opponents, we are tempted to ask ourselves: Is it because his doctrine is understood, or because it is not understood? And we cannot fail to ask: Is it because it opens up new problems, or because it offers new solutions of old problems? Is it because of the cogency of the proofs by which his views are established, or because of some other reasons extrinsic to these views? These questions, however, cannot be answered until we have outlined the central ideas of Bergson's philosophy.

Now this is no easy task, for there are many more ideas in this philosophy than can be summarized intelligibly in a few pages. Moreover, as it is essentially a philosophy of change, mobility, and flux, we need not be surprised if it is always wavering, flickering, undulating. When we are quite sure that we understand, we find a moment later that we did not. When a spark throws its light into our mind, it is followed almost immediately by complete darkness. When we are lifted on the crest of a wave, we almost immediately sink again into the depression that follows it.

We shall try to express those waves of thought that rise most frequently, to catch the fundamental notes that recur with the greatest regularity in this philosophical melody full of changes in the key, tempo, rhythm, and expression. Generally we shall use the author's own words, and our exposition accordingly will consist mostly of quotations. This is the method followed by all the exponents of Professor Bergson's philosophy, even when they do not use quotation marks. Unless otherwise indicated the quotations are from *Creative Evolution* in the English translation—which, however, does not render the picturesque-

ness of Bergson's own style. This work embodies in their latest expression the conclusions of Bergson's other works.

Two ideas seem to give the key to Bergson's philosophy: Duration as the reality of things, and intuition as the means of knowing this reality. Between these must be placed the idea of evolution which explains both the development of reality and the genesis of the faculties of knowledge. These three problems, however, cannot be kept apart; they permeate and essentially depend on one another, and it is only for the sake of clearness that we distinguish them here.

* * *

Professor Bergson's philosophy is essentially a return to the philosophy of Heraclitus. While the school of Elea held that reality is unchangeable, and hence that change is only apparent and illusory, Heraclitus of Ephesus asserted that nothing is permanent, that everything in the world is carried on by the perpetual stream of change, and that consequently things cannot be said to be, but to flow and to become. Now listen to Professor Bergson: "Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself, or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made" (272). "Reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end" (239). "Things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions" (248).

Hence the importance of time or duration which is identical with becoming, and therefore with the reality of things. "Pure duration" has nothing in common with mathematical time which is not real. The scientist constantly tries to think time in terms of space by identifying what he calls time with the straight line by which he graphically represents it. For him time is inert; in reality pure duration is change, activity, creation; it has "real efficacy," and is "a kind of force" (338-345). "The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new" (11).

Whence comes this opposition between physical time and real

duration? From the fact that science insists on attributing to time quantity, number, and homogeneity which belongs only to space. Time in itself is essentially non-quantitative. Why? Because quantity and number imply a co-existence of parts and units, for only co-existing things can form a quantitative or numerical aggregate, and co-existence means juxtaposition in space. To think of time as quantitative and divisible is to substitute simultaneity for succession which is the very essence of time. Time is pure quality and pure heterogeneity, a succession of qualitative changes which merge into one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to be external to one another, hence without any relation to number (*Time and Free Will,* 104).

We may see this more clearly in our own mind, and Bergson protests most emphatically against all forms of quantitative psychology, which consider consciousness as composed of the juxtaposition of distinct states. The mind is constantly changing, and the change is far more radical than we are inclined to suppose at first. For we are at first inclined to think that while sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas, and in general conscious processes of all kind, succeed one another, each remains identical until it is succeeded by another process. The truth, however, is that they are constantly changing, and that "if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow." Even if other influences were not at work, there is at least and in every case the influence of memory which conveys something of the past into the present, so that a mental state, "as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates." We notice the change only when it has become considerable, but "the truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change." The transition from one state to the following is also continuous, and the distinction which we make between our various mental states is artificial; in reality there is an uninterrupted flux. Hence "the apparent discontinuity of the psychical life is due to our attention being fixed on it by a series of separate acts: actually there is only a gentle slope, but in following the broken line of our acts of attention we think we

perceive separate steps." Now the mind feels obliged to reunite by an artificial bond these states which it has distinguished artificially. It imagines a substance, "a formless *ego,* indifferent and unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states which it has set up as independent entities." This substratum has no reality, and the mind is nothing but a perpetual flux. Mental states, conceived as so many solids in space, strung upon an ego or a substance of the soul as a thread, can never make up that duration which flows. Hence "time is just the stuff it [psychical life] is made of. There is no stuff more resistant nor more substantial" (1-4).

What is true of the mind is also true of the whole universe, which, considered in its totality, has "a form of existence like our own" (11), and "matter, looked at as an undivided whole, must be a flux rather than a thing" (186). Briefly, therefore, duration is "the foundation of our being, and . . . the very subtance of the world in which we live" (39), "the very life of things, the fundamental reality" (317).

This assertion will be made clearer when we speak of Bergson's theory of evolution. We shall see that real duration is some form of consciousness, a principle which, by the development of its primitive impulse, is the source of everything that exists. But it seems preferable to outline first Bergson's theory of knowledge.

* * *

From the fact that reality is essentially change, becoming, duration, Bergson infers that our intelligence is not capable of knowing it. There is an opposition between intelligence as the instrument of science, and intuition as the instrument of philosophy. The intellect is a faculty orientated primarily toward action, and its function is essentially utilitarian; hence it is interested in stability rather than in motion, in the distinction between objects rather than in real continuity. Hence again a twofold misapprehension of ever changing and continuous reality as permanent and as divided.

In the first place, the objects we act on are certainly mobile objects, but the important thing for us to know is whither the mobile object is going, and where it is at any moment of its

passage. In other words, our interest is directed first of all to its actual or future positions, and not to the progress by which it passes from one position to another. From mobility itself our intellect turns aside because it has nothing to gain in dealing with it. Although movement is reality itself, the intellect always starts from immobility, and tries to form an idea of movement out of immobilities put together (154-155). Our ideas are thus stable views taken of the instability of things, and the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind. Every picture on the film represents a fixed attitude of the moving object; it is not at all a moving picture, but the movement is in the apparatus whose function is to unroll the film, and, by the rapid succession of pictures, to imitate the movement of the real object. In the same way ideas are, as it were, snapshots representing fixed attitudes, but not the real change, of the passing reality (305-315).

In the second place, the universe is continuous. There is no interruption, no clear-cut division anywhere. The bodies which we perceive are, so to speak, cut out of the stuff of nature by our perception, and the scissors follow in some way the lines along which action might be taken (12). In the immense piece of cloth which is the whole of matter we cut out what we will and sew it together again as we please, and always from the point of view of action. "The intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system" (156-157).

In one word, the function of the intellect is "to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real" (302), and philosophers "are mistaken when they import into the domain of speculation a method of thinking which is made for action" (155). What then will be the method of philosophy? How shall we know the "fluid continuity of the real"? By intuition, and in order to understand the meaning of intuition let us begin with that of instinct to which it is closely related.

"We know that the different species of hymenoptera that have the paralyzing instinct lay their eggs in spiders, beetles or caterpillars, which, having first been subjected by the wasp to a skilful surgical operation, will go on living motionless a cer-

tain number of days, and thus provide the larvæ with fresh meat. In the sting which they give to the nerve-centres of their victim, in order to destroy its power of moving, without killing it, these different species of hymenoptera take into account, so to speak, the different species of prey they respectively attack. The Scolia, which attacks a larva of the rose-beetle, stings it in one point only, but in this point the motor ganglia are concentrated, and those ganglia alone; the stinging of other ganglia might cause death and putrefaction, which it must avoid. The yellow-winged Sphex, which has chosen the cricket for its victim, knows that the cricket has three nerve-centres which serve its three pairs of legs—or at least it acts as if it knew this. It stings the insect first under the neck, then behind the prothorax, and then where the thorax joins the abdomen. The Ammophila Hirsuta gives nine successive strokes of its sting upon nine nerve-centres of its caterpillar, and then seizes the head and squeezes it in its mandibles, enough to cause paralysis without death" (172). Such facts—many others might be mentioned—are not explainable by any kind of intelligence, with its general concepts that are crystallized and dead; they are explainable only by instinct, a sympathy by which the concrete manifestations of life are felt from within rather than known from without, lived rather than represented.

The essential difference between intelligence and instinct is the following: "There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them" (151). More specifically this difference may be examined from the point of view of action and from the point of view of knowledge.

From the point of view of action: If we consider only those typical cases in which the complete triumph of intelligence and of instinct is seen, we find this essential difference between them: instinct is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments; intelligence is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments or tools. The instrument constructed by instinct is the organ itself which is adapted to the satisfaction of immediate needs, but possesses only a very narrow range of action. The tool constructed by intelligence has

a wider range of efficacy, but is less perfectly adapted to the satisfaction of immediate needs (139-141).

From the point of view of knowledge: "Intelligence . . . is the knowledge of a form; instinct implies the knowledge of a matter" (149); that is, instinct has an intimate and full knowledge of its object, a knowledge which is implied in the accomplished action, but which is essentially the knowledge of one special object. Intelligence, on the contrary, possesses an external and empty knowledge of a form, and this form, because it is only a fixed and unchanging representation of change, "a snapshot view of a transition" (302), may be applied to an infinite number of objects.

Intelligence then, because it is adapted to the knowledge of inert matter, is forever unable to find, although always seeking to understand, life, which is continuity, duration, invention, change, creation. Instinct, on the contrary, in its own narrow way, "is molded on the very form of life," and through its action knows life from within; but, because it is incapable of reflection, it is unable to enlarge and extend its object, and hence it will never seek those things which it alone could find (165).

Such instinct is too narrow, too special, too heavily laden with unconsciousness; but if it became disinterested and self-conscious, that is, if it became intuition, it would lead us to the very inwardness of life itself. For intuition means "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely" (176). We find an analogous process in the field of æsthetics. The artist sees not only the assembled features of the object, but the intention of life, the movement that runs through them, binds them together, and gives them significance. To this end he tries to place himself within the object by a kind of sympathy, and to break down the barrier that space puts up between him and his model (177). Æsthetic intuition is narrow and attains only one individual object; philosophical intuition has life in general for its object. Both are a sympathetic union of the mind with its object.

But as empirical sciences, based primarily on facts, need

reason to ascertain these facts and test the value of the conclusions drawn from them, so philosophy, whose chief instrument is intuition, also needs intelligence to verify the facts which lead to the intuitive grasp of reality and to test the value of the intuition itself. It is therefore the union and the co-operation of these two faculties, intuition and intelligence, that will enable us to have a philosophy. "No doubt this philosophy will never obtain a knowledge of its object comparable to that which science has of its own. Intelligence remains the luminous nucleus around which instinct, even enlarged and purified into intuition, forms only a vague nebulosity. But, in default of knowledge properly so-called, reserved to pure intelligence, intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. On the one hand it will utilize the mechanism of intelligence itself to show how intellectual molds cease to be strictly applicable; and on the other hand, by its own work, it will suggest to us the vague feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual molds. . . Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But, though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached" (177).

* * *

The theory of knowledge, that is, the relation of instinct and intuition to intelligence, is not only a method and a starting-point in Professor Bergson's philosophy; it is also the conclusion to which the theory of life leads. Evolution, on the one hand, explains the genesis of both instinct and intelligence, and, on the other, leads to the essentials of an ultimate conception of reality Hence the doctrine of evolution includes two points, the theory of life and the metaphysics of reality.

I. *Theory of Life.*—Like consciousness, life is essentially continuity of change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration, uninterrupted creation. Hence the philosophy

of life is inseparable from the philosophy of its evolution. "The essential thing is the continuous progress indefinitely pursued, an invisible progress, on which each visible organism rides during the short interval of time given it to live" (27). Briefly stated, the evolution of life must be understood as the penetration of matter by a broad current of consciousness, endowed with an enormous multiplicity of interwoven virtualities (181).

This primitive current of life underwent division owing to two influences, one external, the resistance of inert matter, the other internal, the nature of life itself. Life is "like a shell which suddenly bursts into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on" (98). And as the way the shell bursts depends on both the explosive force of the powder it contains and the resistance of the metal surrounding it, so the directions which life takes depend on both the resistance offered to the vital current by inert matter and the explosive force which life bears within itself. Life has overcome the resistance of matter by penetrating and organizing this matter, so that the material organ of the living being represents not so much a sum of means which life employed as a sum of obstacles which it avoided, not so much a positive success of life in furthering its own purpose as a negative success in solving a difficulty and going around an impediment (93). The other cause of division is the very nature of life, "for life is a tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided" (99).

The current of life bifurcated first in two general directions, one toward plants, the other toward animals. But it must be remarked that, in any classification of living beings, the group must not be defined by the exclusive possession of certain properties, but by its tendency to emphasize them. Thus "there is not a single property of vegetable life that is not found, in some degree, in certain animals; not a single characteristic feature of the animal that has not been seen in certain species or at cer-

tain moments in the vegetable world" (106). What, then, is the essential difference between these two directions of life? In general life tends to introduce into matter the greatest possible amount of indetermination, both by the accumulation of potential energy and by the utilization of it according to the needs of action. The plant has taken the lazy course, and applies itself chiefly to the accumulation of energy which it appropriates from the inorganic world, and, as this function does not require any change of place, the plant has condemned itself to fixity and immobility. As a consequence it has condemned itself to unconsciousness, or rather, it has allowed its consciousness to fall "asleep," for actual consciousness varies in proportion to free motion. The animal, on the contrary, applies itself chiefly to the utilization of energy which it derives from plants or from other animals. To this end, organs, and especially the nervous system, have been developed, which, by becoming more and more complex, open a wider field to freedom and indetermination. The animal has evolved in the direction of locomotor activity, and consequently of "awakened" consciousness (105 ff.).

Animal life itself took two divergent directions, one toward instinct, reaching its highest development in hymenoptera, the other toward intelligence, leading to man. Instinct and intelligence are not two degrees of the same faculty; they are "opposite and complementary," but not "things of the same order" (135). Yet, because they have the same common origin, neither is ever found in a pure state. "There is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence" (136). It is this fact that has misled many to admit between instinct and intelligence no more than a difference of degree. But in reality they are of a different kind, and therefore, in opposition to what many evolutionists assert, man and animal cannot be related by any linear evolution.

II. *Metaphysics of Reality.*—So far we have indicated the lines followed by the main divisions of the vital current. Is it possible to go higher, and to reduce matter, life, and mind with

its two manifestations as instinct and intelligence, to one and the same ultimate reality? Yes; the same fundamental essence is common to them, namely, pure duration or becoming, active and creative, which, for want of a better word, we must call consciousness or better supra-consciousness. Its evolution consists of a twofold movement; one upwards, which is life, action making itself, effort, impulse; the other downwards, which is matter, action unmaking itself, extension, for matter is "a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive, and, thereby, of liberty into necessity" (218). Thus "physics is simply psychics inverted" (202), and "the vision we have of the material world is that of a weight which falls" (245). The upward current of life, as we have seen, overcomes the obstacle which it encounters in the downward return of matter by the creation of organs in this matter. To make this clearer, Bergson uses the following comparison: "Let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back, and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit. But a small part of the jet of steam subsists, uncondensed, for some seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their fall. So, from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world" (247), and new worlds are still being born (241, 248).

We find in ourselves something analogical to this double process. "The more we succeed in making ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we feel the different parts of our being enter into each other, and our whole personality concentrate itself in a point, or rather a sharp edge, pressed against the future and cutting into it unceasingly. . . But suppose we let ourselves go, and, instead of acting, dream At once the self is scattered; our past, which till then was gathered together into the indivisible impulsion it communicated to us, is broken up into a thousand recollections made external to

one another. They give up interpenetrating in the degree that they become fixed. Our personality thus descends in the direction of space" (201) since it acquires the characteristics of space, namely, multiplicity and number.

The genesis of intelligence as compared to intuition is parallel to that of matter as compared to the vital current, "intellectuality and materiality being of the same nature and having been produced in the same way" (219, Cf. 199). The human mind also may take two opposite directions. In intuition it follows the ascending direction of life, and is incessant progress and tension. In intelligence it follows the descending direction of matter, and is a regress, a relaxation of tension leading to extension. Matter tends to extension and space, and it is in geometry, the science of extension and space, that human intelligence finds its connatural achievement and triumph (223, 210).

To sum up, in Bergson's words, this whole process of evolution: "Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only the already made and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean with that faculty of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light. To movement, then, everything will be restored, and into movement everything will be resolved. Where the understanding . . . shows us parts infinitely manifold . . . we catch a glimpse of a simple process, an action which is making itself across an action of the same kind which is unmaking itself, like the fiery path torn by the last rocket of a fireworks display through the black cinders of the spent rockets that are falling dead. . . . It is consciousness, or rather supra-consciousness, that is at the origin of life. Consciousness, or supra-consciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter; consciousness, again, is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself, passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms" (250, 261).

The concluding words of *Creative Evolution* express briefly the author's whole philosophical doctrine: "Making a clean

sweep of everything that is only an imaginative symbol, he [the philosopher] will see the material world melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming. And he will thus be prepared to discover real duration there where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm of life and of consciousness. For, so far as inert matter is concerned, we may neglect the flowing without committing a serious error: matter is weighted with geometry; and matter, the reality which *descends,* endures only by its connection with that which *ascends.* But life and consciousness are this very ascension. . . . Philosophy is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort; it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism" (369).

* * *

In the preceding pages we have endeavored to outline the central ideas of Professor Bergson's philosophy. Evidently many interesting features have been omitted, such as the author's conception and defense of freedom, the functions of the brain, the relations between the mind and the organism, the doctrine of sense-perception and memory, of finalism, etc. Intuition as the chief instrument of philosophy; creative evolution as the genetic explanation of life and matter, of intuition and intellect; pure duration, the vital impulse, supra-consciousness, as the ultimate reality of all that exists; such are the foundations of a philosophy which has found its way throughout the world, and in varying degrees permeates its whole thought. What is the reason of this success which has but few parallel instances in the history of philosophy?

Surely it is not the cogency of the proofs by which this philosophy is established, since, according to Bergson, to prove by logical demonstration is to use the fragmentary and inert concepts, the artificial categories, and immutable principles of the intellect, a faculty which is utterly incapable of giving us an insight of reality. What philosophy leads us to is rather a "sympathy" and a "vague feeling"; it makes us live the reality of things rather than know them intellectually. Hence

it is vague and indistinct because, around the intellect as a nucleus, intuition, the instrument of philosophy, is like "an indistinct fringe that fades off into darkness" (46).

Nor consequently is this success due to clearness of thought, obtained by the use of strict definitions and methodical divisions. This is possible for an intellectual, not for an intuitional, philosophy. "A perfect definition applies only to a *completed* reality; now, vital properties are never entirely realized, though always on the way to become so; they are not so much *states* as *tendencies*" (13). We are accustomed to require strict definitions and divisions because we look upon reality as composed of things rather than as consisting essentially of progress and becoming, because we think in terms of space rather than in terms of time, and because we mistake our motionless snap-shot views for the movement which is reality itself.

Undoubtedly the fame of Professor Bergson is due in some measure to the fact that he is an artist, a poet, who pleases by the brilliancy of his style, his frequent use of well-chosen metaphors, figures and comparisons. Remember, for instance, the cinematograph, which, with distinct and motionless pictures, produces the illusion of movement and continuity; the rockets which represent creative evolution, going up as thought full of life and falling extinct as matter; the steam condensed into little drops each of which falling back is a world; the shell that bursts into fragments, bursting again into other fragments, etc. In philosophy perhaps we should qualify this as an abuse of metaphors, because these may be clear while the doctrine they seek to illustrate is obscure; and as the metaphor appeals to the imagination, it may give the reader the illusion that he understands the philosophy. Moreover, the reader naturally supplies the fireworks maker, the substance of the water which resolves into steam, the maker and operator of the moving pictures, and generally the thing, the cause, the substance, with which he has no difficulty in understanding the metaphor. He is in danger of forgetting that Professor Bergson denies all these, and admits only the movement, the duration, the perpetual flux, change, and becoming. Yet the artistic talent of Bergson cannot fail to

elicit admiration, and men are ever inclined to follow those whom they admire. It is an undeniable fact of ordinary psychology that to please is half the work of producing conviction.

Furthermore, Bergson's philosophy is above all a philosophy of life. Owing chiefly to the advance of practical science, man has grown accustomed to pay much more attention to what things do than to what they are, and Bergson constantly emphasizes the dynamic aspect of reality. A conception of the universe as movement and action naturally appeals to men of today who look upon activity and efficiency as the standard according to which the value of every man and of every thing is to be estimated, and who consequently are quite willing to admit with Bergson that man is not *Homo sapiens,* but *Homo faber* (139), that the most important characteristic of man is not knowledge, but action.

More important than all other explanations of Bergson's popularity, however, is the fact that Bergson is a philosopher, whose earnestness, sincerity, and love of truth cannot be doubted, and whose thought is always powerful and original. No time can be more favorable than the present to the development of a philosophy. For years, in the field of philosophy, the human mind has been starved. It was offered a food which was not sufficient to satisfy it, and was denied that which its very nature craves and demands imperiously. The questions which are of vital moment and to which man constantly seeks an answer had been declared forever unanswerable. For, if we except Catholic philosophy, which was given but scant recognition when it was not entirely ignored, the prevalent philosophical systems—Kantianism, positivism, empiricism, associationism, agnosticism—however different from, and even antagonistic to, one another on other points, agreed in denying the possibility of metaphysics. The human mind, tortured by the desire of knowing, turned on all sides for some light toward those who were recognized as the leaders of thought, and to its inquiries almost invariably received the same reply, so tersely expressed by Du Bois-Reymond: "Ignoramus et ignorabimus." We do not know, and we shall never know. Be satisfied with the knowledge of this mate-

rial universe; whatever is spiritual, ultimate, eternal, the first cause and the last end, is forever inaccessible to human reason. Ask not such questions, they cannot be answered. Bergson boldly reacts against this well-nigh universal tendency, and, after shattering the idols of modern agnosticism, starts to build a philosophy, and to answer questions which other philosophers had labelled unknowable and even unworthy of consideration. It is natural that the world should listen to his words. But as there is danger for the starving man not to distinguish sufficiently between food which is wholesome and that which may be injurious, but to take at once the first thing which is offered to him, so perhaps the world, in its eagerness, is too ready to accept at once without sufficient discrimination the solutions now offered of its most vital problems.

* * *

This would lead us naturally to give an estimate of Bergson's philosophy, but we must limit ourselves to a few general remarks. It must be kept in mind that this philosophy is not yet complete, and that even what Professor Bergson has published must not be taken as absolutely final, for, as he tells us, this philosophy " will only be built up by the collective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of many observers also, completing, correcting, and improving one another " (xiv). So far, Bergson has not gone beyond the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind, and cosmology. His views on Theodicy and Ethics are awaited anxiously. To anticipate the author on these points, and to determine beforehand what orientation his doctrine must take, is likely to be misleading, for at times Bergson's thought takes the most sudden and unexpected turns, and all logical implications are in danger of being at fault in a philosophy which is not built with the intellect, and which, like the vital current itself, leads to results that cannot be foreseen.

Bergson's philosophy is certainly a distinct progress on contemporary agnosticism and materialism. The space at our disposal does not allow us to speak of his many noble views, worthy of unreserved praise, of his many valuable criticisms and positive doctrines with which we must heartily agree. But at the

same time it seems clear that the hope, which had been entertained by some Catholic philosophers and apologists, that Bergsonian philosophy might prove to be an auxiliary to the Catholic religion, has to be abandoned.

1. Like Aristotle, Bergson starts from the obvious fact of movement, by which is understood not simply the passage from one place to another, but change in general. Whereas this fact leads Aristotle to the fundamental distinction between, and yet the union of, the reality that changes and the change itself, being and becoming, actuality and potentiality, it leads Bergson to the negation of being, and the assertion that becoming is the reality itself. "In vain shall we seek beneath the change the thing which changes; it is always provisionally, and in order to satisfy our imagination, that we attach the movement to a mobile" (301).

Aristotle seems to hold the only intelligible position. Nothingness cannot become anything, and a change is inconceivable without a reality that changes. For instance, the seed *is* something, and because it *is* a seed it has the potency to *become* an organism. Being is the necessary starting-point of becoming. It is also its terminus, for to become means to become something, and where no reality is acquired, or lost, or modified, there is no change. Finally, the stable causes and conditions of development are also something real.

This relation of being to becoming, of stability to change, appears more clearly in ourselves. Under the manifold changes that take place at the surface in consciousness, under the constant succession of mental processes, ideas, emotions, feelings, sensations, etc., we are obliged to place, not a "formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable" (3)—this is a misunderstanding of what we mean by substance—but an ego-substance, and an ego-agent, a being which underlies the becoming and is a source of activity. Under all these changes our own deeper reality, our person, remains identical. Bergson writes: "When we say 'The child becomes a man,' let us take care not to fathom too deeply the literal meaning of the expression, or we shall find that, when we posit the subject 'child,' the attribute 'man' does

not yet apply to it, and that, when we express the attribute 'man,' it applies no more to the subject 'child.' The reality, which is the *transition* from childhood to manhood, has slipped between our fingers. . . . The truth is that if language here were molded on reality we should not say 'The child becomes the man,' but 'There is becoming from the child to the man'. . . . In the second proposition 'becoming' is a subject. It comes to the front. It is the reality itself" (312, 313). This, it seems, is neither a logical analysis of the sentence, nor a true interpretation of the fact. The logical predicate of the proposition is not 'man,' but 'becoming man': 'The child is becoming a man,' *i. e.*, 'This human being, now a child, is developing to manhood.' He is not actually a man, but because he is a young human being, he has the potency of being a man later. And this human being is a substance, a being that changes in regard to size, strength, reasoning power, and all other characteristics that differentiate the man from the child.

2. If progress, change, becoming, cannot be identified with reality, it follows that the intellect, even if it were incapable of knowing progress as such, can through its immobile concepts apprehend the stable aspects of reality. Its abstract representations reveal what is essential and necessary under the individual and contingent representations of the senses. But, in fact, the intellect can know more than this: it does apprehend progress, movement and life, not, however, without a substance, a being, a mobile, but as the passage of the substance from one state to another, from potency to act. Moreover, is not the very ascension of the intellect from the appearance to the real essence, from the imperfect realization to the ideal type, from the contingent to the necesary, from the temporal to the eternal—is not this progress itself the manifestation of a higher life? The concept is not sterile, but its copulation with other ideas gives it unlimited fecundity. It is not the knowledge of "empty" forms, but of fuller reality; not a screen, but a means of communication, between the mind and reality.

And when intuition is offered as a substitute for intelligence, it is under the plea that intelligence is essentially a faculty of action, not of knowledge; a plea which seems to ignore the real

intelligence, and sets in its stead the stunted, abortive, and mutilated intellect of sensism and associationism. Moreover, is not instinct, to which intuition is reduced, more immediately utilitarian than the intellect, and more directly concerned with action? Finally, since intuitions are variable according to individuals, where is the criterion of true and valid intuition, of the one that reaches reality?

Here, as was seen above, Bergson advocates the intimate co-operation of intuition and intelligence, for intuition is "vague and above all discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most" (267). Hence "dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts, and so be propagated to other men. . . . The philosopher is obliged to abandon intuition, once he has received from it the impetus, and to rely on himself to carry on the movement by pushing the concepts one after another" (238). In one word, intuition needs intelligence "in order not to go astray" (239). Strange control of a faculty which reaches absolute reality by a faculty that gives us only "empty" forms, or rather gives us nothing at all, for "there is no form, since form is immobile, and the reality is movement" (302). A disinterested apprehension of the real, a faculty molded on the very form of life, is now guided and prevented from going astray by a faculty which has for its special function the making of tools, and which is destined exclusively to serve our practical needs. The "lantern glimmering in a tunnel" is called upon to enlighten "the sun which can illuminate the world" (x). Is not this an instance of the blind leading the blind, and even of the blind leading those who see? After estranging so radically these two faculties from each other, it is in vain that an effort is made to bring them together again in mutual co-operation. But, as an argument *ad hominem*, we retain the implied admission that an intellectualistic criticism of Bergson's philosophy is valid, since logic is granted the right to put intuition to the proof.

3. Creative evolution leads us again to the contradiction of a change without anything changing, of a movement without a

moving object, of an evolution without any reality that evolves. It leads us also to monism, at least in the sense of the substantial identity of all that exists in the universe, since we have only manifestations of one and the same supra-consciousness. Matter is but the movement downward and the relaxation of the same current which, as a movement upward and in a state of tension, is life. Souls "are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself" (270). Spirit and matter are therefore substantially identical; they are the same action making itself or unmaking itself. And what is the cause of this process of evolution? We are told that "a Principle of creation has been put at the base of things" (275), but what is this principle with a capital initial? Evidently it is time, pure duration, the vital impulse, consciousness. Is this sufficient, and is it offered as a substitute for God? Bergson, it is true, has given us only a Cosmology, and therefore his explanation of the world is rightly restricted to principles immanent in the world. But it is clear from his anti-intellectualistic principles that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by reason, since proof supposes the validity of concepts, the immutability of principles, and the fixity of certain truths.

Although Bergson has not yet explicitly stated his views on Theodicy, the following lines on God are found in *Creative Evolution:* "There are no things; there are only actions. . . . Now, if the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether it is that which is unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display—provided, however, that I do not present this centre as a *thing,* but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus defined has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely" (248).

This passage seems to contain the expression of absolute monism, of the substantial identity, not only of all things in the world, but also of God with the world. Yet, Professor Bergson,

in two letters published in *Etudes* (February 20, 1912), explains these words as meaning that God is the "source" from which spring the various currents, every one of which will be a world, and that, therefore, God is "distinct" from these. He speaks of God as a "free creator, generator of both matter and life," and of his doctrine as "a refutation of monism and pantheism in general" (515-517). But we cannot refrain from thinking that the distinction between God and the world is not sharp enough, and that, while Professor Bergson is not a monist like Spinoza, creation as understood by him is certainly not creation as understood by the Church, but some kind of an emanation of all things from the divine reality. Nor can his God, who is unknowable to reason and who has nothing of the already made, but is a centre or a source of shooting out, ever be the Infinite Creator of the universe, distinct from everything else by His very fullness of being and perfection. It is, therefore, in a sense different from that of Saint Paul that Professor Bergson applies to the absolute as conceived by him the words which the Apostle applies to God (Acts xvii, 28). No; it is not of the absolute felt vaguely in intuition, but of God as known by reason, "for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. i, 20); it is not of the absolute conceived as becoming, but of God who gives to Himself the name of "He who is" (Exod. iii, 14) and who "changeth not" (Mal. iii, 6); it is not of the absolute who has nothing of the already made, but of God of whose "greatness there is no end" (Ps. cxliv, 3), that Saint Paul speaks when he utters the sublime words: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being."

C. A. Dubray, S. M.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Mediaeval Church Architecture of England. By Charles Herbert Moore. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. xxii + 237.

The purpose of this book is to set forth the character of mediaeval church architecture in England in the light of a structural analysis and comparison with the French Gothic art, and of the conditions and influences under which it was produced. It appears to be generally assumed that there was in the Middle Ages a common pointed style, current in all parts of Europe, which, though differing in minor ways in different localities, was essentially the same everywhere. A discriminating study and comparison of the various forms of mediaeval pointed architecture will not justify this view. Such, at least, is Mr. Moore's opinion. "The vigorous spirit of the Northern races was, indeed, widely operative, but under varying circumstances, and with different results according to local conditions. In the Ile de France alone did racial and other conditions conspire to produce an essentially new art, the principles of which were never grasped elsewhere." Things so different as the pointed architecture of the Ile de France, on the one hand, and all other varieties of pointed building, on the other, ought not, Mr. Moore contends, to be called by the same name; for this implies similarity of character and leads to confusion. For the sake of clearness, therefore, he would restrict the use of the term "Gothic" to the French art, using the general term "Pointed" for that architecture of the Middle Ages, whether in England or elsewhere, in which the pointed arch, and other new details, are merely applied to forms of building that retain the structural character of the older art.

But the question of names is of secondary importance. Mr. Moore's object is not only to demonstrate the essential difference of English mediaeval architecture from the French Gothic (notwithstanding that it drew largely and constantly from the French source), but also to do justice to what he considers its finer qualities. While radically different from the French Gothic, and

abounding in structural inconsistencies, the Early English has, he maintains, the quality of beauty to a degree found in few other styles and it had, moreover, possibilities that were never fully worked out. For after 1250 conditions in England, as on the Continent, had changed, and as the finer inspiration declined, architecture became increasingly florid and ostentatious—"a condition that has always marked declining art"—until it sunk into the dry and mechanical formalities of the "Perpendicular Style." Mr. Moore has followed the English art through the various stages of decline, but he has not dwelt on what he regards as its decadence with the same fulness that he has given to its prime. He has not, indeed, treated any part of the subject exhaustively; that would be a task of great magnitude, but he has done enough to set forth the character of English church architecture in the Middle Ages with substantial thoroughness, and enough to emphasize the great and fundamental difference between it and the contemporaneous art of the Ile de France.

Mr. Moore has evidently bestowed great labor on the present volume, which is enhanced with twenty-three plates in half-tone and one hundred and forty-nine illustrations in the text. These latter are, with a few exceptions, from the author's own drawings and from photography, and witness to the care with which he has examined the greater part of the more important mediaeval churches in England. They who have profited by Mr. Moore's earlier works "Development and Character of Gothic Architecture" and "Character of Renaissance Architecture," will surely desire to have this his latest volume. It is a contribution of the utmost value and importance to the history of the Mediaeval Church architecture of England and its author has laid all students of the subject under a new debt. The make-up of the book reflects the greatest credit on the publishers.

PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

The Mirror of Oxford. By C. B. Dawson, S. J., M. A. (Exeter College). London: Sands and Co., 1913. Pp. xii + 265.

Ever since religious disablities have been removed, and all the privileges of Oxford life once again opened to Catholic students, there has been need of just such a book as Father Dawson has here provided. The volume before us opens with a brief review of Oxford's history from the time of its patroness, St. Frideswide, who lived in the first half of the eighth century, to the building of the new church dedicated to SS. Edmund and Frideswide in 1910. This introductory is followed by a chapter on the connection of Oxford with the Religious Orders—a connection recently renewed through the Benedictines, Jesuits and Capuchins. The author next deals with "Oxford's old Churches," amongst which the first place is naturally given to the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, commonly called the University Church. After this the different colleges and halls at Oxford are described individually, in the order of their foundation, beginning with Merton and ending with Keble. There is a closing chapter on "Modern Oxford": it tells of the changes that have taken place since the year 1850 which may be seen to mark an entirely new epoch in the history of the University. The volume is enriched with forty well-chosen illustrations from photographs and with a comprehensive map of Oxford at the Reformation. A full and informing index adds to the completeness of the work which may well serve as a model of its kind. In giving us "The Mirror of Oxford" Father Dawson has not only sucessfully accomplished his task of "providing Catholic visitors with a story of the University written by a sympathetic hand," but he has done much more, as is indicated by the fact that he has so completely avoided any narrowness of tone in his treatment of the Reformation period. His hand-book is altogether worthy of its subject and of the best traditions. It is full of interest and instruction both for Catholic visitors to Oxford and for those who have to content themselves with reading about the City and University.

PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

A Divine Friend. By the Rev. Henry C. Schuyler, S. T. L., with a preface by the Very Rev. Mgr. R. Hugh Benson, M. A. Peter Reilly, Philadelphia, 1913. 8°. Pp. 142.

Le Courage du Christ. Par Henry C. Schuyler, S. T. L. Traduit de l'Anglais par F. J. Bonnasseux, Paris, 1913; La Charité du Christ—idem; L'Obéissance du Christ—idem.

In these works the reader is introduced to a species of literature comparatively unknown. Catholic theology is rich in treatises on the divinity of Christ formally considered, on the Incarnation and its consequences, the part played by the life and death of the Saviour in the great work of salvation, etc.; but relatively little has been written on the Saviour's supremely human characteristics as such, *e. g.*, on His courage and sensibilities, His patience and obedience, His friendships and personal affections as a man. Of course, one need not travel far to find the true solution. The Catholic Church has ever been conscious of and faithful to her primary mission in life, namely, to explain, declare, and defend the divinity of Jesus Christ. In the early centuries the humanity of the Saviour, or at least the perfection of His humanity, was at divers times either questioned or denied, but in every instance the Church proved not unfaithful to her divine commission of not only defending the main truth but also the whole truth. The consequence of this collective defensive action has been her unmistakable definition with regard to Who and What Christ was. Jesus united in Himself, *i. e.*, in His one and undivided Personality, two perfect natures, the human and the divine, so that the historical Christ is declared to have been at once both perfect God and perfect man. For the most part and especially in modern times Catholic apologists have not been called upon to prove that Jesus was man; their task has rather been to prove that He was more than man. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that the character of the literary output has been largely measured by the apologetic demand. The world has been literally flooded with a rich and abundant Catholic literature calculated to defend the divinity of Christ, while relatively little has been written by Catholics on these distinctively human characteristics of Jesus. Never more than now was there need for a Catholic literature neither defensive nor militant, but essentially constructive, presenting Catholicism, not as arrayed in

full armor with levelled lance, but as a thing of beauty, a system of doctrine many-sided and comprehensive. Precisely for this reason our present volume serves a noble and useful purpose. It succeeds in drawing attention to what in reality is a truly Catholic principle, namely, that selective stress and pedagogical distinction are not tantamount to exclusion and that the Catholic Church, while emphasizing the Divinity of Jesus, is not at all unconscious of His supremely real humanity.

The author has already favored the reading public with several volumes on "The Courage of Christ," "The Charity of Christ," and "The Obedience of Christ." A delightful French version of these volumes under the titles "La Charitié du Christ," "L'Obéissance du Christ," and "Le Courage du Christ" (translated by F. J. Bonnassieux, published by P. Lethielleux, Paris), has recently appeared, and bears eloquent testimony to the way in which the author's literary efforts have been received across the ocean. The present volume is a contribution to the same series, and it is the reviewer's sincerest hope that it will meet with the same reception as its predecessors, and will be translated, not only into French but also into several other tongues. A work of such exquisite taste and real literary merit can not be too widely published or too generally known.

The critic's attention is attracted at once by the constructive style of the book. The publishers are to be congratulated for producing such a pleasing volume for a very reasonable price; and it is to be hoped that other publishers will use the same ingenuity in placing within popular reach volumes that are moderate in price and artistically constructed. The illustrations, skillfully toned and delicately tinted, are a delight to the eye and worthy of a volume generally sold at four times the actual price of the present volume. Seifert's bust picture of the Divine Friend, which the author has selected for his frontispiece, is very captivating and haunts one long after the volume has been read and laid away.

But it is in the soul of the author discernable in every line of the book that the real charm of the volume consists. The reviewer is conscious of dealing with a personality rather than with a mere written word. The Divine Friendship of which this person speaks impresses one as being an experience he is trying to describe rather than a mere fact of which he has heard and read. It is not meant that the author simply unfolds in his pages a series of unhistorical

or at best subjective speculations. It is quite the contrary. The author takes as the basis of his work the history of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels and popularly interpreted by tradition, and without discussing the various literary problems involved, points out those features and personal gleanings in the life of Jesus which illustrate and typify the truly human affections of the Saviour. In successive chapters he describes the personal attachment that existed between Jesus on one hand and on the other the Baptist, Nicodemus, Judas, St. Peter, Lazarus, Martha, Mary Magdalen and the Beloved Disciple; and in each instance the author's description, as well as his private reflections reveal a personal insight to which scholarship minus friendship would be totally strange. In other words, the friendship of Jesus is described by one who views the Saviour and His relations through the sympathetic eyes of friendship. We take great pleasure, therefore, in recommending, with this volume, the entire series, to all who desire to come into closer personal contact with the Divine Friend.

F. M. O'Reilly.

Advanced American History. By S. E. Foreman: New York, The Century Co., 1914. Pp. 634.

The title *Advanced American History* must have been intended by the publishers to describe a work more advanced than a grammar school history, for this book is quite elementary and is evidently designed for the use of high schools. It is introduced by a concise account of Europe in the fifteenth century. The first chapter alludes to the presence in China and Tartary of mediæval travellers like Marco Polo. The European travellers in Cathay, in addition to the Polos, were John of Monte Corvino and other Franciscan friars. Because of their contributions to geographical knowledge, to say nothing of their spiritual heroism, they deserve at least a paragraph from posterity.

It is evident that the author has not carefully read the *Journal* kept by Columbus on his first voyage, for economic reasons alone are assigned as the motives for that memorable expedition, whereas it is well known that the primary purpose of Columbus was the extension of Christianity. The economic interpretation of history

may assist in the explanation of many modern achievements. It will not always do so in the ages of faith. An explicit reference should have connected with the exploits of Columbus the expediton commanded by John Cabot.

The physical geography of the United States is concisely described; likewise its climate, plants, and animals. The sketch of the North American Indian is brief but interesting. A short chapter tells of the rise of England, a topic of great intrinsic interest.

The author passes without observation the more recent opinion that John Smith possessed a talent for intrigue and was responsible for not a little of the confusion that reigned in Jamestown. Two maps well illustrate the different interpretations placed upon the Virginia charter of 1609. The coming of claimants, of which there were by the middle of the seventeenth century no fewer than four, is well told. New Netherland was the official name of the Dutch colony, though in Europe there was a reason for writing Netherlands.

The history of the settlement and development of the English colonies is related with much ability and perfect fairness. An instructive section shows the area of settlement and the distribution of population; also the industrial and commercial systems of colonial times. The importance of Irish Presbyterian immigration is set forth with great detail in the pages on the "Scotch-Irish," as the author terms the settlers from Ulster. Religion, government, and education are also noticed.

In his account of the struggle for a continent the author, by an excerpt from Parkman, suggests the zeal and the heroism of the Jesuits in Canada, and the unequal nature of the conflict between the English and the French. In our opinion the exile of the Acadians should have been mentioned as a blot on the English escutcheon. The author appears to have overlooked the literature on this subject. The terrible defeat of the British at Ticonderoga has been allowed to pass unnoticed. The period between the treaty of Paris and the beginnings of the quarrel with England is admirably described and well illustrated.

In discussing the causes of the Revolution the author does not make it clear that the opposition to the Quebec Act was an early manifestation of religious intolerance. High school students should be taught that on this subject the Continental Congress used one set of sentiments in their correspondence with King George III and quite another in their address to the Canadians.

The military phase of the Revolution is not given, as sometimes it is in school books, any undue prominence, but even a hurried sketch should have mentioned the victory of De Grasse over the English fleet at the capes of the Chesapeake; also the friendship of the Spanish authorities at New Orleans, and of the Dutch at Saint Eustatia, in the West Indies. In the section on the extension of geographical knowledge and those on the chapters treating of the establishment of the English colonies the author is not at his best. Yet even in this small part of his book there are very few inaccuracies.

Dr. Foreman writes an entertaining and instructive narrative. His book is concerned with government, with the rise and progress of industries, the movements of population, the struggles of commerce, and the strife of parties. Territorial expansion, the rise and fall of the slave power, the war for Southern independence, the questions growing out of Reconstruction, and the restoration to political power of the natural leaders of society in the South are clearly set forth.

One might take exception to the treatment of Mormonism, in which no mention is made of polygamy. The prophet's quiet teaching on the subject of Cyprian saints, chartered sisters of charity, and spiritual wives led to the secession of many of the early Mormon leaders and to the publication by them of the *Nauvoo Expositor* in which Joseph Smith was denounced. The destruction of its press and other property was one of the justifications and but one, for the visit to the Mormon town of the Carthage Greys and the removal of the prophet to Carthage, where he and his brother, Hyrum Smith, were shot.

The narrative brings the reader as far as the election of President Wilson and in doing so touches a multitude of topics. When one has followed the author from one industrial triumph to another, and from the camp of one political party to that of another, one will conclude that he is chiefly interested in the daily life of the American people. For him social movements are the great attraction. A few limitations have been noticed. In most other works they are far more numerous. In the choice as well as the treatment of themes, Dr. Foreman has been exceedingly happy. In our judgment he places the emphasis precisely where it should be placed and has prepared a remarkably accurate and valuable textbooks for high schools.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE

Alumni Meeting. The Alumni Association of the Catholic University of America, held its Annual Meeting on Wednesday, April 16, at the Savoy Hotel, New York. After the business meeting a banquet was served to over one hundred and fifty members and invited guests. Among the speakers were Cardinal Farley, who responded to the toast, "The Holy Father," Reverend William B. Martin, President of the Association, who responded to the toast "The President," and Monsignor Shahan, who spoke on "The University in Retrospect and Prospect." Hon. W. Bourke Cochran spoke on "The University as a Great Light," and Mr. Patrick Francis Murphy chose as his topic "Time and Chance, the Uncontrollable Twins."

Public Lecture. On Thursday, March 26, Doctor Joseph Dunn delivered a lecture in MacMahon Hall on "The Celtic Languages and the People Who Speak Them."

Minstrel Show. The members of the Calumet Club are diligently rehearsing a "Show" which is to be put on the local stage and on the stages of several parish halls in Washington. The first date is Monday, April 20, at the Brookland Town Hall.

Public Lecture. On Thursday, March 19, Hon. William H. De Lacy lectured in MacMahon Hall on "The Temperance Movement in Europe."

Doctor Kerby was recently appointed as a member of a Committee of five to investigate and report to the Attorney General, on the revision and codification of laws affecting children in the District of Columbia. He is also serving on a Committee appointed by the National Civic Federation to study

the efficiency of organized social service in relation to progress. This Committee is to investigate and report also on mutual relations of volunteer and public charities. This work is part of a national survey inaugurated by the National Civic Federation. Twenty-five Committees will undertake to study as many phases of American industrial and social progress during the last generation.

The New Dining-Hall is now practically ready for use. The interior decorations, panelling, fixtures and so forth are being completed, and the formal opening will take place in the near future.

Bust of Cardinal Gibbons. On Wednesday, April 22, a bust of Cardinal Gibbons was unveiled in the Reception Room of Gibbons Hall. An appropriate address was delivered by Archbishop Moeller.